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The impact on the required airship size for obtaining a given level of performance from the
airship/surface ship team is examined by varying the number of fire control units (AWG-9s)
carried by the airship from 2 to 12. Costs of the proposed system are estimated. Scenarios
ar. developed for convoy missions in a low to moderate ASCM threat environment and for
surface battle group operations in a high threat (60, closely spaced ASCMs) environment.
Measures of effectiveness for convoy protection are based on variations of achievable
Depth-of- ire by AAW escorts on attacking aircraft and ASCMs. Surface battle group AAW
effectiveness is measured by calculation of the "saturation"level of ASCMs required to
overwhelm individual "state of the ar" AAW escorts, It is shown that using an airship/
surface escort based AAW defensive system for convoys will halve the requirement for
AAW surface escorts, In the surface battle group scenario it is shown that a combination of
airships and olderAAW escorts results in, asignificant reduction in the total number of AAW
escorts required to counter the ASCM threat, reduction in the number of escorts expected to
receive damage during a raid, and the atrition of 90% of the attacking tactical aircraft. The
cost of obtaining the indicated AAW capability over a 30 year life-cycle is shown to be at
least 3 times lower when using an airship based system compared to using a combination of
fixed-wing and helicopters.
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ABSTRACT
A system is proposed to combine an airship based fire control system (using off-the-shelf
hardware) with surface ship launched SAMs (NTU/SM-2 ER) to provide OTH wide area
ASCM defense for convoys and surface battle groups currently without organic airborne
AAW assets. The effectiveness of surface ship AAW area defense is compared, both with
and without the airship system, against low-flying ASCMs. The proposed airship system is
based on combining the F-14 fire control system (AWG-9) with extrapolations from the
current DARPA sponsored design for an operational development model airship (ODM).
The impact on the required airship size for obtaining a given level of performance from the
airship/surface ship team is examined by varying the number of fire control units (AWG-9s)
carried by the airship from 2 to 12. Costs of the proposed system are estimated. Scenarios
are developed for convoy missioni in a low to moderate ASCM threat environment and for
surface battle group operations in a high threat (60, closcbly spaced ASCMs) environment.
Measures of effectiveness for convoy protection are based on variations of achievable
Depth-of-Fire by AAW escorts on attacking aircraft and ASCMs, Surface battle group AAW
effectiveness is measured by calculation of the "saturation"level of ASCMs required to
overwhelm individual "state of the art" AAW escorts. It is shown that using an airship/
surface escort based AAW defensive system for convoys will halve the requirement for
AAW surface escorts. In the surface battle group scenario it is shown that a combination of
airships and older AAW escorts results in, a significant reduction in the total number of AAW
escorts required to counter the ASCM threat, reduction in the number of escorts expected to
receive damage during a raid, and the attrition of 90% of the attacking tactical aircraft. The
cost of obtaining the indicated AAW capability over a 30 year life-cycle is shown to be at
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L INTRODUCTION
The "Revolution at Sea" as envisioned by Vice Admiral Metcalf indicates a radical
change in therole, since 1942, of surface warships [Ref. 1]. This changing role is areflection
of the tremendous firepower it is possib)e to place on a single surface combatant, with the
advent of the long range cruise missile. Even in the face of severe budget reductions, many
advocates of the "revolution" remain optimistic because of a force wide multiplier effect to
be seen by giving a serious offensive role for surface combatant operations, independent of
CV Battle Groups [Ref. 2].
The major benefit of having a surface force which would be capable of conducting major
operations without carrier or land based air support is the relief given to the existing limited
carrier assets. If an adversary has to consider the movements and intentions of several
powerful surface action groups in addition to the current carrier centered forces, he would
be forced to dilute his forces, perhaps forced to move from an offensive position toward a
defensive one, and at the very least, introduce a large measure of uncertainty into the
situation.1 As reported in the December1988 issue of the Proceedings of the Navallnstitute,
a prominent role for surface combatants was called for in Surface Combatants Force Re-
quirements Study (SCFRS), the first "official" naval campaign analysis conducted in a
decade. According to the Proceedings, SCFRS calls for the independent use of surface
forces in two primary arenas, the Surface Action Group (SAG) as described above, and
tThis assumes, of course, the tactical wisdom is exercised, not to present the enemy the
opportunity to move his combined strength against each force in turn. This also assumes the
surface force envisioned can be procured and operated at a lower overall cost than carrier or
land based forces.
protection of the shipping [Ref. 3]. Convoy escort or Protection of Shipping (POS), has been
the traditional domain of the surface fleet. The assumption is that the carrier forces will be
maneuvering to confront the adversary directly and so cannot be spared to guard the maritime
logistics supply lines. The most capable "state of tie art" surface units will be required in
support of carrier operations, leaving vital convoy duty to "low cost" frigates. In SCFRS,
the concept of "flexible transition" where older formerly primary anti-air warfare (AAW)
escorts, with "upgrades" to extend their useful lives, will move into the convoy escort role.
The assumption is made that the threat to shipping will be of a lower order than the threat to
CVBGs. The idea of a "flexible transition" is attractive for several reasons. It extends the
pay back period over which to recoup the expense of modifying and upgrading the extensive
fleet of older AAW cruisers, most of which has already taken place, with installations such
as the "New Threat Upgrade" (NTU) package. The second reason the concept is attractive
is the increase in the number of hulls dedicated to convoy duties, in the face of the potential
damage that might be caused by an underestimate of an adversary's concentration on the
supply lines. That is to say, by keeping the pressure on the sea lines of communication, the
enemy could force the use of carrier assets in a defensive role, counter to the forward role
expressed in "Maritime Strategy" (Ref. 4].
Unfortunately for the surface advocates, the birth of the revolution may have been
stillborn in December of 1987 when the Secretary of the Navy announced the cancellation
of the Naval Airship program, as the first of many austerity measures. This paper demon-
strates the central role of organic air surveillance in tie realization of the "Revolution at Sea".
A system is described for combining airships and AAW escorts for AAW defense. This
combination is proposed to have a synergistic effect wherein the strengths inherent in each
platform offset the weaknesses of the other. The primary missions for the airship-surface
combatant teams are convoy defense and surface action (strike) groups. These missions are
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examined to evaluate, in quantifiable terms, the capabilities of surface combatants with and
without the proposed airship system.
3
II. THE AIRSHIP SYSTEM
The airship-based system has as its basis three key concepts and hardware developments.
a. the "sea launched, air targeted" surface-to-air missile
b. the surface AAW tactic "RTLOS"
c. the Operational Development Model airship
These developments are described in the following paragraphs.
In the late 1970s, D.G. Kinney, an analyst in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (OASD), described extending the already proven use of airships for airborne early
warning (AEW) to the role of an airborne fire control system [Ref. 5]. The acronym "SLAT"
was coined, by Kinney, for a surface-to-air missile that was "sea launched, air targeted" [Ref.
6]. The use of air-to-air missiles from an airship was also considered. Most significant to
this analysis was the near unconstrained supply of missiles in the SAM firing surface ship.
The concept of an airship-based fire control system was endorsed by the unlikely source of
the Soviet Navy. In a 1980 paper, two Soviet officers made a favorable assessment for the
survivability of a U.S. Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) when aided by a proposed five airship
squadron equipped with the AWG-9 fire control system and the Phoenix air-to-air missile
[Ref. 7].
The pivotal concept has been the development of the use of one surface AAW escort to
relay air search radar data via the "Link II" tactical data link (NTDS) to another surface
AAW escort which, in turn, uses the remote radar data to launch and guide a SAM into
terminal homing. The capability is known as "Remote Targeted, Launch on Search"
(RTLOS) and has been operationally demonstrated [Ref. 8]. An extension of RTLOS allows
4
for a missile to be flred by one AAW escort based on the search radar data from the tactical
data link with the difference that final control of the SAM is "passed" or transferred from the
launching ship to the ship providing the remote data link input. The remote ship then takes
control of the SAM, as though the SAM had been launched from the remote ship, It is the
this extension of RTLOS that provides the SLAT capability to the airship system.[Ref. 9]
The last major development occurred in 1987 when, as the result of a competitive bid,
Westinghouse-Airship Industries (WAI) was awarded a $169 million dollar contract to build
and test a 2,3 million cubic foot (mcf) displacement prototype Battle Group Surveillance
airship [Ref. 10], The combat system of the airship was to be based on components from
existing naval aircraft.1
As a developmental vehicle, the prototype was to demonstrate the following:
a. operate at 10,000 ft
b. achieve a dash speed of near 90 knots
c, validate the concept of a 96 hour replenishment cycle
d. operate as an organic asset to a Surface Battle Group for a period of not less than 30
days without external (from the battle group) support
e. accomplish the above without excessive demands on existing battle group assets
The airship system proposed in this analysis is based on projecting the current WAI
development program to cover a vehicle which has sufficient lift to support a surface-to-air
'As originally conceived, the ODM was to be based on the E2-C combat suite, however
WAI later proposed an alternative avionics suite (for payload weight and cost savings )from
the S3-B "Viking" carrier based ASW aircraft, combined with the TPS-63 air search radar.
The Westinghouse TPS-63 radar was developed for U.S.M.C. requirements and has been in
use for a number of years in aerostat applications. It is the "alternative" combat system upon
which this paper is based.
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missile fire control system. The fire control system is to be developed from off-the-shelf
hardware by integrating AWG-9 fire control units, NTU hardware and the avionics suite
from the ODM airs.Lip.2 The me,'ulting combat system would provide a SLAT capability
between the airship and a suitably modified NTU AAW escort.
A. FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
The most difficult level of performance to judge is not that of the airship, but that of a
fire control system which can be installed in a given airship design? For the purpose of
analysis, the level of performance desired from the airship fire control system will be the
ability to conduct 12 simultaneous engagements. This level of performance does not imply
the airship would necessarily support 12 targets in terminal homing simultaneously, but that
the system has the ability to have surface-to-air missiles airborne against 12 targets. Given
the state of the art in modem AAW escorts, this level of performance for the airship/AAW
escort team is considered moderate.
Rather than conduct a sensitivity analysis around the 12 engagement figure to determine
the impact of failing to obtain the desired performance level, the airship combat system will
be varied across a range of complexity to gauge the impact of achieving the desired
performance level on tho airship design. The combat system will start with a low level of
inherent capability, with the complexity of the system (and weight) increasing. This goal is
accomplished by initially sizing the airship with a base line avionics suite, as intended for the
2The first two to four AWG-9 units would be mounted on the roof of the control car.
Additional units would be suspended internally from the. envelope. Envelope mounting of
radars on airships was demonstrated on the ZPG-3W series airships.
3A large body of literature is available on the actual and theoretical characteristics of
airships. For the interested reader, the Reference List cites numerous sources on the history
of airships, the engineering and physical principles involved in buoyant flight.
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ODM, with the addition of NTLJ hardware, a JTIDS data link and 2 AWO-9 fire control
systems. To enhance the system capability, the number of AWO-9 units is increased with
an attendant increase in airship displacement. From it's characteristics, the Hughes AWG-
9 fire control system is readily adaptable for work with the NTJU variants of the Standard
missile family [Ref. 11:sec. 3.5.2]. Given that one AWG-9 system can support at least one
engagement, the requirement to support 12 engagements is assured at the extreme position
of including 12 AWG-9 systems on the airship. With such a large number of fire control
radars in close proximity, management of electromagnetic interference (EMI) becomes a
critical requirement.
1. Track Management
The airship fire control system is illustrated in Figure 1. Target detection and
tracking is accomplished primarily with the aid of the Westinghouse TPS-63 air search radar
and tracking system. However, inputs for track management are taken from the installed
AWG-9 units operating in an air search or Track-While-Scan mode. When the airship's air
search radar detects a new target the information is passed to the Target Tracker and the NTU
fire control computer [Ref. 12]. The NTU fire control computer assigns the earliest available
AWG-9 fire control unit to assist the TPS-63 search radar in establishing a "track" on the
newly detected target and relays the detection and a standby to engage order to the data linked
surface AAW escort.'[Ref. 13] If a AWG-9 unit is available, it will pass data on the new
target to the Tracker in conjuction with the TPS-63 with the objective of reducing the time
taken to establish the track and begin the engagement phase. If an AWG-9 unit is not
4The track is established when the Kalman filter algorithm has received enough data to
make accurate predictions of the future position of the new target. The filter process starts
at target detection and a prediction of where the target should be on the next scan is made
based on the update from the previous scans of the search radar, with the prediction
improving with additional scans, When a predetermined number (m out n) of the filter's
predictions of the targets future position "match" the position found on succeeding search





available to assist, the TPS-63 data will, in time, establish a track on the new target [Ref. 14].
The terminal engagement phase for the airship fire control system is assumed to last 30
seconds. The AWG-9 assigned to the engagement spends 10 seconds in a target update TWS
mode and the remaining 20 seconds in target illumination. When the number of targets
engaged at any one time reaches the limit of 12, and assuming the SAM launching platforms
have been able to support a rate of fire requiring back-to-back terminal engagements for the
number of illuminators in the system, then each AWG-9 unit in the system will be in a TWS
mode for, at most, 20 seconds out of each minute. During the 20 seconds each AWQ-9 unit
is in the TWS mode it will be providing update data to the Tracker on all of the targets in its
field of view, not just the target it is specifically assigned. This comes from the necessity of
the AWG-9 to distinguish the intended target from all others in the field of view, As
established earlier, tracks (Kalman filter), assumiing no high rate maneuvering on the part of
the target, improve over time. If the target does maneuver, the filter's estimated position for
the target will deviate from the true position and the quality of the track decreases until the
either the filter is supplied with enough new data to return to a high quality track status or
the target breaks out of the bounds established for the filter and the track is declared "lost".
When a track is declared lost, the system must start the trdck building process over again. To
reduce the number of lost tracks, the predetermined bounds on the filter's estimates are set
by the accuracy and rate of the expected data input, and must not be to tight. This
requirement, not to be too sensitive based on the quality of the search radar input, sets a limit
on how accw'ate the filter's estimate can ever be. The minimum of 20 seconds of target
update data received each minute from each AWG-9 unit will improve the filter's estimate
of the position of those targets in the units field of view, beyond that achievable based on
search radar input alone. The newly tightened estimate will start to decay to the level
supported by search radar input as soon as the AWG-9 input is removed, but the overall result
will tend toward either a reduction in the length of time required for the terminal
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engagement phase or a reduction in the energy level required for the SAM to have available,
to complete an intercept. The impact of this additional update data will increase with the
number of fire control units in the system.
2. Target Engagement
When the Tracker informs the NTU fire control computer of the track of the new
target, the computer will, in the fully automatic mode of operation, review the status of the
target as to friend or foe (1FF input), the engageability of the target (the SAM limits and fire
control limits), and the status of engagements currently in progress (the number of tracks
under fire, the number of SAMs airborne, weapons status from the surface escorts and the
planned terminal phase scheduling). If a conflict exists, the NTU computer will place the
track in a queue to await resolution. After this status review, if no conflicts exist, the NTU
computer calculates the intercept requirements and orders the launch of a SAM, via the
=TIDS data link, from the surface escort. The surface escort, which has been receiving
updates on the target via the dedicated link, will fire the SAM [Ref. 11 :sec. 2.5]. NTU SAM
guidance is accomplished from the controlling agent by relaying, by means of the SAM data
link, the target's course, speed and relative position (to the SAM). A NTU compatible SAM
uses an inertial guidance unit to maintain an estimate of its own position [Ref. 15]. Upon
receiving a mid-course update on the target position, the SAM calculates its own steering
orders to effect intercept. The SAM also passes Its derived position estimate over the SAM
data link to the controlling agent. The airship will continue to pass position updates on the
engaged track to the surface ship, as during the early portion of SAM flight, the ship will be
responsible for maintaining the data link to the SAM. At some point in the SAM's fly out,
the airship will take control of the missile's guidance. The point at which the airship takes
over control from the surface escort may occur over a wide range. The earliest point that the
airship may take control is when the SAM is outbound with respect to both the airship and
the firing ship. The latest point for the airship to establish control is just prior to the SAM's
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decent below the firing ship's horizon.5 The airship has been monitoring the SAM data link
from launch. When the airship determines the time has arrived to take direct control of the
SAM, it orders the surface escort to cease transmitting to the SAM and starts transmitting on
the appropriate fum control channel. From the point at which the airship takes control of the
SAM data link, the interception is completed in the normal manner for semi-active missiles,
with the exception explained below. [Ref. 16]
Except in the case of rapid scanning phased array radars, search radars do not
generally have a position update ordata rate fast enough to allow use of the search radar alone
during the SAM's entire flight. At some point, a high data rate fire control radar must be
made available to zero out tracking errors built up over the time of the missiles flight, to allow
positioning of the SAM so the target will be in the SAM's seeker field of view at the initiation
of terminal homing. Viability of the RTLOS/SLAT tactic requires the search radar involved
to have a data rate sufficient to support a SAM in flight. For mechanically rotated search
radars, as on NTU AAW escorts and the airship system proposed here, the data rate is the
antenna rotation rate. If the search radar position update on a target Is to low, uncertainty as
to the targets actual position is not reduced sufficiently for successful SAM guidance.[Ref.
11 :sec. 2.2] As discussed above in Track Management, the airship fire control system will
be required to provide 30 seconds of dedicated AWG-9 time to support the terminal
5The reason for the latest point for the airship to establish control of the SAM is fairly self-
evident, the rational behind the earliest point is to ensure the airship has an aft aspect angle
on the SAM, to ensure the data link antennas on the SAM and the airship are in alignment.
This earliest point for the airship to take control is reached at the instant of launch, if the firing
ship is between the airship and target, but the SAM must fly out past the airship before airship
control is established if the airship is between the firing ship and the target.
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engagement of any target.' The first phase of terminal engagement requires the dedicated
AWO-9 unit to update the Tracker's current predicted position for the target at the start of
terminal homing. The AWG..9 will provide the update by operating in the Track-While-Scan
mode (TWS), for 10 seconds, over the region predicted to contain the target. The SAM's
trajectory will be revised, during this phase, to maneuver to a position where the SAM seeker
will be able to "see" the target at the start of the illumination phase. The terminal engagement
is continued by entering into the illumination phase. In the 20 second long illumination
phase, the dedicated AWG-9 unit provides the required X-band CW radiation for seeker
guidance. The airship also supplies the rear reference signal required for SAM guidance.
Figure 2 illustrates the proposed airship detection, track and engagement sequence.
3. Airship Compatible Surface-to-Air Missile Performance
When discussing airship controlled engagements, the assumption is made that the
SAM employed is a variant of the Standard missile family at least as advanced as the NTU
SM-2 ER Block III with a kinetic range on the order of 100 nautical miles [Ref. 17]. The
missile is also assumed to have an average velocity, to near its kinetic range limit, of Mach
3. The assumed missile capabilities fall between the unclassified performance figures for the
SM-2(ER) and those for the no longer employed Talos surface-to-air missile [Ref. 18]. The
assumed engagement envelope would be comparable to that shown in Figure 3 for the Talos
missile.
'The rotation rate of the TPS-63 in its fastest mode of operation at 12 rpm, is marginally
capable of supporting Launch on Search. To improve performance, the rotation speed of the
TPS.63 is increased to 20 rpm and the antenna size increased to counter the ensuing decrease
in receiver sensitivity (caused by shortening the signal integration time) the higher rpm
entails. A weight increase of 200 lbs. has been allotted for the modification.
12
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4. Modifications Required To NTU AAW Escorts
Rather than modifying the existing combat system hardware and software (and es-
timating the cost of such modifications) the simpler expedient is taken of hard wiring a false
target emulator, slaved via the data link to the airship, into the AAW weapons control portion
of the escorts combat system.
S. Fire Control System Limitations
There 3re additional constraints on conducting fire control operations from a
platform physically separated from the SAM firing units, whether the controlling unit is
another surface AAW escort or an airship. One Is to reduce measurement errors or
uncentainty to within limits that allow an intercept. Additionally, consideration must be
given the engageability of a target based on the geometry between the fire control platform,
the SAM and the firing platform. The offset of the fire control platform from the SAM firing
unit, relative to the target's track, Is the primary factor in target engageability. The following
four factors are the primary considerations for acceptable intercept geometries:
a. SAM rear reference signal antenna
b. SAM data up link antenna
c. maximum seeker slew angle
d. illuminator angle
For jam resistance considerations, the SAM rear reference and up-link antennas, are
limited in field of view to, at most, the rear hemisphere of the missile. To perform an
interception with a NTU senrd-active homing missile, the SAM seeker antenna must be able
to point directly at the target at the start of terminal illumination and stay on the target until
intercept. The NTU SAM's fly out course is direct to the estimated point of interception, i.e.,
the SAM does not chase the target. SAM seeker maximum slew angle limits engageability
when the intercept fly out course would require the seeker to try to look behind the maximum
15
allowable angle. Such a geometry would occur when making an attempt on a target with a
speed advantage over the SAM, with the intercept to take place after the target is past and
opening. Before the SAM seeker can locate the target an external source must illuminate the
target. Problems occur when insufficient radiation from the external illuminator is reflected
from the target toward the SAM. The target can be expected to re-radiate the impinging
illuminator energy omnidirectionally in a hemisphere whose base is a plane perpendicular
to the angle of illumination incidence. If the SAM seeker line of sight to the target lies outside
of the hemispherical reflected illuminator energy, an intercept cannot occur. This situation
will occur over a portion of the track of any target whose track passes between the airship and
the firing unit.
If the offarL between the airship and firing escort is less than 25 nautical miles, it can
be shown most of the intercept geometry problems occur in only a small portion of any
overall target track. This remains true over a broad range of the primary interception limiting
factors. The adverse impact of intercept geometry is eliminated when the airship operates
inside of the surface horizon of the firing unit, about 15 nm. When the airship is inside of
the firing unit's surface horizon, engageability problems still exist, but when a target cannot
be engaged from the airship, it will be engageable by the surface AAW escort. When the
airship is inside of the firing unit'v surface horizon, the airship is considered essentially co-
located with the firing unit,
For a human operator to "eyeball" where engageability of a target begins and ends,
would be a difficult task, i.e., to determine target eingageabilty based on simple radar scope
displays alone. When the airship is linked to multiple surface escorts, the ability of an
operator to judge the limits of engageability from radar dlata alone is most unlikely,
considering the engageability patchwork each airship and surface ship combination would
generate.
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The resulting problem is termed targeting ambiguity. While targeting ambiguity is
a serious problem for a human operator, it represents only a small additional work load for
current computer driven fire control systems.
To reduce the impact of fir control measurement errors and interception geometry
limitations, the following equipment modifications and restrictions will apply to airship fire
control system:
a. for any engagement, the airship may be linked to only two NTU configured AAW
escorts
b. the maximum offset examined from the airship to linked escort is on the order of 15
nm
c. SAMs are tracked from launch to 25 nm in order to measure bias errors in the
SM-2 inertial guidance unit 7
d. the airship is capable of making a precise measurement of the range and bearing to
the launching escort at the instant of SAM launch
e. the lower limit of the variable PRF of the AWG-9 radar is lowered to increase
the unambiguous range resolution [taking advantage of the low clutter (low speed)
Firship environment]
f. AWG-9 antennas are increased from a 32 to a 72 inch diameter, improving system
performance by a factor of two
B. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
The airship will deploy with the surface battle group or convoy as outlined in the original
concept for the surveillance airship (Appendix B, p. 132). The scenarios presented, with
minor exceptions, will evaluate the performance of a single airship. However, particularly
in the battle group scenario, multiple airship operations may be desirable. The specification
'An upper envelop mounted APS-137 radar is modified to act as 3-D precision tracker
by splitting the feed to an additional antenna. The additional antenna is rotated in the vertical
plane, instead of the normal horizontal, to act as a height finder.
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for 96 hours on station is primarily driven by the worst case assumption of single airship
operations. If two to thre airships are actually used, the requirement for 96 hours between
refueling evolutions becomes of secondary importance. When multiple airship use is
planned, reducing the fuel load to 48 hours on station will make available approximately
10,000 lbs. for additional mission payload, such as externally slung sensors, expendable
counter-measures, point defense (Sparrow) or UAVs. While operating at the reduced fuel
load, three airships would support the mission payload of four fully fueled airships.
The airship's maintenance will be the responsibility of the 25 man airship crew. The
maintainability of the airship will support deployments of at least six months, with 30 day
line periods followed by ten days for maintenance. A force structure of 21 airships will
support the continuous deployment of three airships to the Pacific (Seventh Fleet) and three
airships to the Atlantic (Sixth Fleet), Airship deployments will be on a 18 month cycle, i.e,,
one year between deployments.
Airships will participate in the pre-deployment exercises of the surface group or
squadron with which they are to deploy. The airship commanding officers will report
directly to the commander of the surface group or squadron.
C. AIRSHIP CONFIGURATION
The sources for the basic airship system parameters used here are, primarily, the work
of the Naval Air Development Center, Warminster Pa. (NADC) and associated contractors
in airship design requirements, and the previously cited work of WAI on the ongoing
development of a 2.3 mcf displacement, airship. This airship is currently In the final design
stage under the auspices of the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency.[Ref. 19]
The impact of the fire control system on the airship design is principally centered on
the overall weight of the system. The following estimates are made for the mission payload
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required for three variations of the airship fire control system. The fire control system
variations are:
a. 2 AWG-9 systems
b. 6 AWG-9 systems
c. 12 AWG-9 systems
1. Mission Payload Weight Estimates
The weight of the base line mission payload, as shown in Table 1, is first estimated.
The base line mission payload is that which is carried on all airship variants. The weight of
the fire control system Is then estimated for each variant and combined with the base line
weight for the total mission payload in Table 2.1
2. Airship Size
Based on the variation in the fire control system weight, the proposed airship must
support a mission payload from between 23,000 and 35,000 lbs. The graph in Figure 4 is
based on the NADC Naval Airship Program for Sizing and Performance (NAPSP), a
computer based tool for estimating airship design parameters [Ref.20]. For a given airship
mission payload, altitude, speed and endurance requirements, NAPSP will determine the
displacement required to accomplish the mission. The curves in Figure 4 have been
generated for an airship capable of cruising at 45 knots for 96 hours at a given altitude, with
a maximum speed of 90 knots at the same altitude. When Figure 4 is entered at the mission
payload weights calculated for the three airship variations at the 10,000 altitude, displace-
ments and approximately 2.5 mcf, 3.0 mcf and 3.5 mcf respectively.
'The combat system avionics package from the ODM airship is approximately 4500
pounds. However, to allow for system growth and to provide a margin for error, 10,200
pounds is used here.
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TABLE 1
WEIGHT ESTIMATE FOR THE BASE LINE MISSION PAYLOAD





TPS-63 antenna mod 200 lbs.
Base line Avionics sub total: 10,400 lbs.
Computers/Interface (2) 200 lbs.
Transceivers/Antennas(2) 300 lbs.
JTIDS 200 lbs.
Rear Reference (2) 250 lbs.
APS-137 SAM Track 630 lbs.
Base line NTU sub total: 1,580 lbs.
Crew/Spares Group:
25 men @ 220 lbs 5,500 lbs.
Tools and Spares 1,370 lbs.
Food, 3 lbs/day/man. 2,250 lbs.
Crew sub total: 9,120 lbs.
Base line Mission Payload: 21,000 lbs.
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TABLE 2
ESTIMATE OF AIRSHIP TOTAL MISSION PAYLOAD FOR
2, 6 AND 12 ILLUMINATORS
(Base line Payload + Fire Control System Weight)
Airship Variant One, 2 Illuminators:
Fire Control Group:
Base line Payload: 21,000 lbs.
AWG-9 (2) 2,000 lbs.
Fire Control sub total: .2,000 lbs.
Mission Payload: 23,000 lbs.
Airship Variant Two, 6 Illuminators:
Base line Payload: 21,000 lbs.
Fire Control Group:
AWG-9 (6) 6,000 lbs.
+200kw Prime Power. 400 lbs.
Structure/Cabling. 1,000 lbs.
Fire Control sub total: _7400 Ibs.
Mission Payload: 28,400 lbs.
Airship Variant Three, 12 Illuminators:
Base line Payload: 21,000 lbs.
Fire Control Group:
AWG-9 (12) 10,800 lbs. *
+400kw Prime Power 800 lbs.
Structure!Cabling 2,000 lbs.
Fire Control sub total: IMQU lbs.
Mission Payload: 34,600 lbs.







Strategy and tactics may have changed a great deal since the end of WWII, but one
constant has been the reliance on seaborne transport to maintain the logistics pipeline.
Clearly the success of any maritime strategy depends on the ability to keep the sea lines of
communication open. There is some debate as to whether convoys, in the traditional sense,
will play an important role in future conflicts. Relying on recent operational experience in
the Persian Gulf, it would appear that in the near term, alternate technologies will not replace
convoys in the conventional sense.
A. THE MODERN CONVOY
If the importance of sea based transport has not changed, the nature of the merchant
vessels has. The size of the vessels has increased by several orders of magnitude. The speeds
which modern merchant vessels can sustain are probably twice that of their World War II
counterparts [Ref. 21:p. 105]. On the other hand, the maneuverability of the modern
merchant, in terms of turning radius, acceleration and stopping distance is poorer on average
than the earlier more handy vessels. In view of the changes in merchant ship characteristics,
convoy procedures are modified from those in WWII. The first change is the number of
ships in the convoy. Rather than have 60 or more ships in a convoy, it is ,reasonable to
suppose at most 25 ships will be included. ( Based on the relative number of ships available
and the question of how much can be afforded to be lost, a la Atlantic Conve" or.)
The second change is the spacing between ships. In the Second World War spacing for
ships in convoy was roughly a rectangular grid of 1000 X 800 yards with 800 yards the
distance between ships in any column and 1000 yards, the distance between columns [Ref.
23
21:p. 103]. Considering the size of current vessels, the convoy grid in the scenario will be
2000 X 2000 yards.
1. Convoy Scenario
Under the assumption that the air and naval forces have checked the enemy major
surface combatants, the open ocean threat to convoys would be submarines and long range
bombers. The exact number and type of escorts would be determined by the relative
significance of the threat. That is to say, if the threat was primarily from torpedo firing
submarines it would be desirable (for a given level of resources) to have the minimum
resources in AAW platforms with the bulk in ASW platfo;,nis. As the relative threat level
shifts toward ASCM firing aircraft and submarines the most desirable mix of escorts shifts
to favor the AAW platforms. It is this situation that extends the useful life of older AAW
escorts through "flexible transition", This scenario will explicitly examine the ASW aspects
of convoy defense only to the extent to which AAW defensive requirements impact ASW.
2. Threat Assumptions
The threat launch platforms against the convoy are considered to be:
a solitary bomber
b. a "cell" consisting of one spotter aircraft with 2 raider aircraft
c. diesel and nuclear powered submarines
In all cases, the accompanying missile threat will be low flying ASCMs over the speed
range of .75 to 1.5 Mach. In the case of aircraft, each will carry either 2 long range
(150 nm) missiles or 4 medium range (60 nm) missiles. The submarines will be limited
to launching missiles within 60 nm of the convoy center.
Further assumptions shall be:
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a. raiding aircraft are not constrained by fuel
b. raiding aircraft and submarines will have real time or near real time targeting data
available via second party
c. ASCMs are designed to cross the target's radar horizon between 25 and 50 feet.
The tactics of the raiders are considered to be essentially free, in that they may choose
to:
a. attack convoy units indiscriminately with regard to merchant vessel escorts
b. give a high priority to targeting merchant vessels
c. target the primary AAW units early to set up convoy for future air attack
d. target the ASW screen to set up for submarine attack
Stripping the escorts is particularly attractive in a Pacific basin scenario, with long
transits involved and thus the longer period over which to exploit a success over the escorts.
Targeting the escorts would seem to be less attractive in the relatively short runs through the
North Alantic in support of NATO. This selective targeting will considered to be the extent
of aircraft/submarine cooperation.
As per current policy, the AAW screening platforms will be selected from the older
classes of Y-ruiser/DDGs which have received service life extending upgrades. The convoy
scenario, shown in Figure 5, will be examined with various combinations of
AAW platforms, with and without first generation airship augmentation.
B. MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AAW SCREEN
The ASCM threat level posed in the scenario is, at most, 8 missiles. This threat is
relatively low, compared to a battle group scenario. The most direct measure of AAW screen
effectiveness is the number of firing opportunities the screen can generate against a
penetrating aircraft or missile. Commonly called "firepower" or "depth of fire" (DOF),
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Figure 5. Typical Convoy with Airship and Surface Escorts
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this measure, as here used, is modified from that described in Naval Operations Analysis
(NOA) [Ref. 22:pp. 228-239]. Also considered as measures of effectiveness will be elements
derived from the DOF figures, the maximum cross range for a given depth of fire, the
maximum cross range at a targets closest point of approach and the area of coverage. The
modifications to the NOA definition of depth of fire are to allow for the impact of low flying
missiles and the limitations of fire control system.
The first change concerns the use, in NOA, of the surface to air missile's maximum
effective range as setting the range of the first intercept. In the case of the low flyer, unless
the SAM of interest has an extremely short maximum effective range, the radar horizon
combined with the fire control system reaction time and the SAM's average velocity will
determine the actual point of earliest intercept. For the convoy scenario, with the ASCM
crossing the radar horizon at 25 feet, and assuming a search radar height of 75 feet, the radar
horizon is calculated to be at 17 nm. Figure 6 shows the assumptions for the radar horizon
and the DOF calculations.
A delay has been added to the time a missile crosses the horizon until a surface to air
missile is launched, to account for the time interval for detection, establishing a track/fire
control solution, assigning and firing the SAM. The time delays for the older technology
AAW escort are 25, 30 and 35seconds. The delay encountered while utilizing the first
generation airship will be 120 seconds from the airships radar horizon for air launched over-
the-horizon shots and the escorts reaction time for "pop-up" sub launched missiles. The
actual detection range is random variable dependent on many environmental and detection
system parameters. Those readers uncomfortable with the horizon simplification may feel
free to consider the system delay times for the surface ships to represent three values of a
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by A SCMTAx F Firinr Range, represents Fire
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Intercept launched.
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traveled by the ASCM from SAM launch
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(see Appendix B, p. 129 for DOF Equations)
Figure 6. Depth of Fire Calculations for Low Plying Targets
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The second modification allows for a brief period after an apparent interception to assess
damage to the target. Five seconds will be used for the damage assessment delay between
interception and launch of the next SAM. The third departure from the NOA method involves
taking into consideration the SAM system minimum engagement range. The SAM systems
in this scenario will be considered to have minimum ranges between 3 and 6 nautical miles.
The minimum range for airship assisted interceptions will be 15 nautical miles from the SAM
launching ship when co-located, to up to the maximum allowable airship/AAW ship offset
of 25 nm. These limits are imposed on airship assisted interceptions to reflect data link and
position errors limits of the first generation airship. For pop-up targets the minimum range
will be at least the minimurm ranve of the SAM launchine shiv and 2 nm from the airship.
1. Depth Of Fire For Convoys Without Airships
Utilizing the concepts developed in Figure 6, depth of tire calculations were per-
formed for target velocities from Mach .75 to Mach 1.5 in increments of 0.25.
A contour is plotted in Figure 7, for a AAW escort utilizing a Mach 3 SAM with only
the assumptions for target velocity and height, fire control and damage assessment delays,
included, In using the depth of fire plot, the contour axis of symmetry is turned to parallel
the targets path (from top to bottom ) through the engagement zone. The plot has no
relationship to the firing ship's true heading, it represents the engagements possible for a
ASCM crossing 10 nm astern of the ship at a right angle as well as a cruise missile
approaching the ship bowon. Each of the curves, counted from top to bottom, represents
the locus of all succesive interception points on targets who's flight path is parallel to the axis
of symmetry.
In Figure 8 the contour is shown plotted with the further assumption for the AAW
ships fire control systems minimum range constraints. Note, in Figure 8, the seriously
disruptive effect minimum range constraints have on the depth of fire achievable on closing
targets which have paths that pass inside the minimum range. The most imme',tLU
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Assumptions:
ASCM at Mach 1, and 25 ft.
AAW Escort: Mach 3 SAM, 3NM Minimum
Range, Fire Control Delay 30 seconds
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Figure 8. DOF Contour, SAM Minimum Range 3 NM
31
impression is, in trying to counter an AAW platform with such a depth of fire contour, the
path of least resistance is to attack the AAW ship.
In Figure 9 the cross range at intercept versea successive interception opportunities,
on closing targets, is plotted for various ASCM velocities and AAW ship reaction times. The
curves are plotted as continuous functions even though depth of fire is strictly a discrete
phenomena to simplify the presentation. Depth of fire is seen to drop off rapidly with both
an increase in system reaction time and ASCM velocity. The minimum range at which a fire
control system may successfully complete an intercept appears to be a critical factor for any
interception opportunities beyond 2, across a wide range of system parameters and ASCM
speeds,
2. Depth Of Fire, Convoys With First Generation Airship
Considering now, a convoy accompanied with an airship, contours developed for a
NTU AAW ship acting as a launch platform for a first generation airship performing
intercept control. Figure 10 shows the resulting contour against a raiding aircraft flying at
25 ft. above the water at 0.75 Mach when the SAM launching ship and airship are essentially
co-located (within 15 nautical miles). In this case, airship augmentation takes place for those
interceptions prior to the AAW ships radar horizon, at which point the AAW ships
unaugmented DOF contour would be added, The AAW ships unaugmented DOF contour
Is not shown in Figure 10 for reasons of scale.
In Figure 11 the range at intercept verses successive interception opportunities when
augmented by airship, on closing targets, is plotted for the range of potential ASCM
velocities and the AAW ship reaction times. The data from unaugmented escorts is included
for comparison,
3. Minimum Significant Depth of Fire
The large number of ships in the convoy presents a special problem in the defense
against low flyers. The convoy, even with expanded spacing, represents a rather dense group
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DOF on Target Crossing Escort's Field of Fire with a
Closest Point of Aproach (C.P.A.) u Indicastel
3 sets of 3 curves are shown. Each set of curves is for the indicated Target velocity. The individual curves in a
set represent performance with fire control delay. of 35,30
and 25 seconds from inner to oust curves respectivoly.
Additional Assitmpdons:
Search Radar Hoight a 75 feet
Target Height above water a 50 feet
SAM Average Velocity a Mach 3.0
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Figure 9. DOF of Surface Escorts on Crossing Targets, by C. P. A.
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Assumptions:
Long Range Bomber @ 0.75 Mach, 25 ft.
Airship @ 10,000 ft. within 15 nm of Escort
Fire Control Delay - 120 seconds
Escort using Mach 3 SAM
Radar Horizon .- -
120 -135nm 
-"
100 . Assumed SAM Kinetic Limit
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Figure 10. DOF Contour, NTU AAW Escort with Airship Targeting
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Assumptions:
AIRSHIP at 10,000 feet and essentially co-located with NTU ESCORT
SAM Average Velocity w Mach 3.0
Fire Control Delay - 120 seconds
Danage Asenment Dealy - 5 seconds
Target Height 3 50 feet
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Figure 11. DOF, Airship Targeting on Crossing Targets
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of large objects which will screen a portion of the horizon from the escorts. The term
"flicker" arises from the successive masking and unmasking of the ASCM as it crosses the
random gaps created by the convoy in the AAW ships radar coverage. Fire control systems
need to see a target for a period of time in which to establish a "track" and generate a fire
control solution. Flicker will increase the time required to generate the track. Once a "track"
is established and a missile is fired, when the target passes behind the superstructure of a
convoy unit, the track and thus the intercept opportunity is likely to be lost. Loss of the
intercept opportunity is almost guaranteed if line of sight to the target is interrupted during
the terminal homing phase of SAM flight. Raiding aircraft can be expected to utilize flicker
to their advantage, by using the convoy ships as a screen to interfere with the detection and
interception of low flying ASCMs. As will be seen, fire control from the airborne system
will avoid the flicker effect.
A closed form optimal solution for AAW ship spacing does not exist for the case of
low flying anti-ship missiles. For this paper a simple graphical method for determining the
best spacing for a given number of AAW escorts was developed by using transparent
overlays of the DOF contours shown earlier.
Raiding aircraft will be looking for broad avenues of attack (of several miles width)
which have a readily discernible lower average depth of f&e. It is assumed that gaps in
coverage of less than I to 2 miles would not be detected by raiding aircraft working in close
to the convoy (utilizing the radar horizon) because the raider is developing a targeting picture
by taking numerous "short looks". And by similar considerations, raiders using a stand off
long range surface search aircraft will not be able to take advantage of small gaps because
of range and bearing resolution limItations of the search aircraft radar. Table 3 lists the
smallest significant depth of fire for a given number of AAW escorts.
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TABLE 3
MINIMUM SIGNIFICANT DOF AGAINST ATTACK BY MACH 1 ASCMS
(ASCMs Launched at Over-The-Horizon Ranges)





* Intercepts completed by I nm from convoy, ASCMs at 25 feet, system reaction time 30
seconds, SAM average velocity, Mach 3, SAM minimum ea.,ge 3 nm.
At the very least, if there is any aircraft threat to the convoy, at least 2 AAW ships must
be detailed, It is understood ships which are primarily considered AAW escorts may have
an excellent ASW capability. However, the requirements of performing as a close in AAW
escort (5-15 nm) will probably seriously compromise the use of the escort's passive ASW
ability, which requires 35 nm of distance from the convoy.
Table 4 re-examines the above scenario for the smallest significant DOF or AAW
escorts augmented with first generation airships. Additional assumptions are the airship and
escorts are essentially co-located and the escorts are within 5 nm of the convoy outer limits.
It is apparent the first generation airship could have a significant impact on AAW
effectiveness in a convoy scenario. The addition of the first airship generates a minimum
significant DOF with only one AAW escort which equals that from 4 unagumented escorts.
Of perhaps greater significance, a single AAW escort augmented with an airship will havo
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TABLE 4
MINIMUM SIGNIFICANT DOF AGAINST ATTACK BY MACH I ASCMS
(Airship Augmented Convoy)
Number of:







Intercepts completed by 1 nm from convoy, ASCMs at 25 feet, system reaction time 30
seconds, SAM average velocity, Mach 3, SAM minimum range 3 nm.
on the order of 2 to 4 firing opportunities (referring back to Figure 10) on launching platforms
seeking to close the convoy to within 60 nm, to use shorter ranged ASCMs. The ability of
the first generation airship/NIU team to force raider standoff ranges to increase, and or
conduct intercepts on raiding aircraft, presents the following benefits to the convoy:
a. both the number carried and terminal velocity of the available low flying ASCMs
decreases at greater launch ranges
b. as the range at release of the ASCM increases, the targeting accuracy falls off (of
particular interest when escorts are targeted)
c. a significant DOF may be maintained for the defense of ASW escorts at ranges on the
order of 40 nm from the AAW escorts where before 10 nm was the limit
d. the time between interception attempts is substantially greater indicating raids of a
higher density could be handled
The net result is, convoys with airship augmented AAW escorts arm likely to "see"
smaller air raids than convoys with unaugmented escorts. The smaller raid of lower density
38
leads to the conclusion that less capable escorts in terms of number of launchers and
reloading times may be utilized.
4. Depth of Fire Measures in the ASCM Firing Submarine Environment
The cruise missile firing submarine is most often considered in the context of a threat
to aircraft carriers, or perhaps to the carrier's underway replenishment group as opposed to
a threat to merchant convoys [Ref. 23]. The ability to"pop-up" without appreciable warning
anywhere from a few miles from the target vessel to more than 60 miles away (targeting
problems aside) gives the submarine a great deal of flexibility in "surprising" the victim's
defenses. The missile launching submarine strikes directly at the airship's primary contri-
bution to the convoy's protection, the ability to shoot early and often, and for this reason it
must be considered a threat to convoy ships.
First, convoy defense is considered for unaugrrented AAW escorts. The most
immediate consequence of submarine launched ASCMs is the existence of a "dead zone"
around the periphery of the convoy, for which AAW defense is essentially zero (the
exception is the chance the missile will pass inside the range of an escorts close-in weapons
system, including the potential for the target being the escort). This zone exists because of
the AAW escorts lag time from target appearance to SAM launch. Under the assumption of
firing delays in the convoy scenario of on the order of 25 to 35 seconds, Table 5 shows the
horizontal distance from the outer edge of the convoy to a distance inside of which a
submarine launched attack will give surface AAW escorts no opportunity to intercept.
For missiles launched at ranges greater than those in Table 5, escorts should have at
least one opportunity for engagement after the ASCM passes and is opening from the escort.
Likewise, the submarine launch distance from the escort which will allow the first intercep-
tion opportunity on a closing ASCM will be on the order of 8-10 nm for the .75 Mach missile,
9-11 nm for Mach 1 missile, and 12-15 nm for a missile closing the convoy at Mach 1.5, based
on the system reaction time assumed.
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TABLE S
CONVOY AAW ESCORT NO SHOT ZONE AS A FUNCTION OF DELAY TIME
AND ASCM SPEED
(ASCM Launch Range (am), From Escort)
ASCM Speed
Delay Time. .75 Mach Mach 1 Mach 1.5
25 sec. 3.12 4.17 6.25
30 sec. 3.75 5.0 7.5
35 sec. 4.38 5.83 8.75
Intercepts completed by 1 nm from convoy, ASCMs at 25 feet, SAM average velocity, Mach
3, no SAM minimum range considerations.
SAM system minimum range considerations, which where ignored in Table 5, are
included in examining escort DOF contours. Figures 12 and 13 display Depth of Fire
contours forMach 1 ASCMs launched atranges of 10 and 13 nm from the AAW escort, given
a 25 second system reaction time and a 3 nm minimum range. Relative to DOF contours for
over-the-horizon launched ASCMs (those launched at 17 nm or greater for surface escorts
alone), the depth of fire is compressed and narrowed. Minimum firing range, while a
significant factor in the OTH case, becomes crucial against pop-up missiles.
The minimum significant depth of fire for a given number of AAW escorts was
calculated based on the assumptions that the escorts (with a 30 sec. reaction time) were 5 nm
from the convoy and a Mach I ASCM was launched 10 nm out from the escorts. The depth
of fire is then recalculated with a launch at 5 nm out from the escort. The results are. shown
in Table 6.
In the case for a convoy defended by 4 AAW escorts, at the 10 nm ASCM launch, one
escort will be completely blocked by the convoy. Two of the escorts will have to wait for
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Figure 13. DOF Contour, Submarine Launched ASCM (13 nm)
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reducing the intercept opportunity to one apiece. Only the escort to which the ASCM makes
its closest point of approach will have 2 fiuing opportunities, When the firing range is
reduced to 5 nm, in the 4 escort case, 2 escorts will be blocked by the convoy and the other
2 escorts will only have one intercept opportunity each before they too are blocked by the
convoy body.
TABLE 6
MINIMUM SIGNIFICANT DOF AGAINST ATTACK BY MACH 1 ASCMS
(ASCMs Submarine Launched)
Launch @ 10 nm from Escorts (17.5 nm from convoy center)





Launch @ 5 nm from Escorts (12.5 nm from convoy center)





Intercepts completed by 1 nm from convoy, ASCMs at 25 feet, SAM average velocity, Mach
3, SAM minimum range, 3 nm.
a. Airship Supported Convoys
The submarine launched attack scenario was re-examined with the NTU AAW
escorts augmented with first generation airships, with the results shown in Table 7.
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TABLE 7
MINIMUM SIGNIFICANT DOF AGAINST ATTACK BY MACH 1 ASCMS
CONVOY ESCORTS AUGMENTED BY AIRSHIPS
(ASCMs Submarine Launched)
Launch @ 10 nm from Escorts (17.5 nm from convoy center)
Number of:





Launch @ 5 nm from Escorts (12.5 nm from convoy center)
Number of:





Intercepts completed by 1 nm from convoy, ASCMs at 25 feet, SAM average velocity, Mach
3, SAM minimum range, 3 nm.
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The improvement in minimum significant DOF of the airship augmented AAW
escorts, in the 10 nm launch case, is based on a reduction In both the delay to fire time and
blocking of fire by the convoy body. In the 5 nm launching case, the Increased DOF is
attributed to the increased firing zone,
The scenario, with or without airships, is extremely sensitive to the assumption of
a 3 to I ,,peed advantage of the AAW escorts SAM over the submarines ASCM. The use of
actual missile average velocities (of the sort generally used in handbooks) is of little value,
in that the major portion of the region of engagement tends to be inside the acceleration zones
of the missiles concerned, The decline in performance, as the 3 to I SAM speed advantage
is lost, does not appear to favoreither airship augmentedor unaugmented escorts, as both fare
poorly. Over a very narrow region, at the point at which escorts lose the ability to engage
ASCMs by reason of reaction time, a slight advantage goes to a greater number of
unaugmented escorts over a smaller number of augmented escorts. The advantage exists by
reason of a greater relative density of close in weapons systems in the former case. The favor
is slight considering the limited (by design) ability of such systems toengage targets crossing
at ranges of greater than I to 2 nautical miles, The airship augmented intercepts also suffer
from targeting ambiguity which arises when a ASCM would pass between the firing escort
(in lateral range) and the controlling airship. This problem can be reduced by having an
airship take station very close to convoy center and establish a link with 2 opposed escorts.
This tactic reduces targeting ambiguity because the airship induced intarcepts, in this case,
are derived from bringing in shots from the disengaged side of the convoy. Thus the airship
and the offside escort utilized always see a closing target.
As the submarine launching distance increases beyond 17 nm from the escorts, the
definite advantage of airship augmentation is reasserted. When ASCMs in launched from
30 nm, as shown in Table 8, airship augmented AAW escorts have recovered approximately
half of the DOF from the case where ASCMs are launched outside of 100 nm.
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TABLE S
MINIMUM SIGNIFICANT DOF AGAINST ATTACK BY MACH 1 ASCMS,
CONVOY ESCORTS AUGMENTED BY AIRSHIPS
(ASCMs, Submarine Launched from 30 run)
Number of:







Intercepts completed by 1 nm from convoy, ASCMs at 25 feet, SAM average velocity, Mach
3, SAM minimum range, 3 rim.
The submarine launched ASCM poses a definite hazard to convoy operations.
There is a substantial zone from in which a submarine may launch a missile, which for all
practical purposes, is not countered by older AAW escorts. The most critical factors in
reducing this "dead zone" rest with decreasing system reaction time, ensuring a large speed
advantage for the SAM over the ASCM, reducing the SAM minimum range and maintaining
the widest possible field of fire. The airship, in the dead zone, only helps in achieving the
latter.
Before the entire convoy escort disposition is distorted to cover a close in
submarine launched missile attack, the utility of a missile shot from the submarine's tactical
point of view should be considered. When the submarine has successfully penetrated to
inside of 5 nm a missile attack would have to be seen as an attempt to reduce the probability
of an immediate counter-attack from the surface escorts, while launching a conventional
torpedo attack. The submarine that has succeeded in closing to 5 nm undetected acoustically
is a serious threat from torpedoes alone, regardless of any ASCM threat it might pose.
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The most serious impact of the close in, submarine launched, missile attack on
convoys protected by airships would be the requirement to hold the AAW escorts inside of
10 nm from the convoys limits and keep the airship(s) tightly centered on the convoy. With
no serious threat of submarine launched missiles inside of 20 rm, the convoy commander
would be ahte to have a significant DOF against raiding aircraft while being free to move the
AAW escorts as far as 30 nm away from the convoy and/or open the convoy spacing to 10
nm between units. The latter offers the potential, in ASW terms, of operating as a moving
"protected lane". When submarine launched cruise missiles are introduced to the AAW
picture, augmenting AAW escorts with airships still allows for a 2 to 1 reduction in the
number of escorts required for a given level of defense, while at the same time, incivasing
the flexibility of escort and convoy stationing with respect to ASW concerns.
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IV. THE SURFACE ACTION GROUP
The threat environment in which the Surface Action Group is expected to ope.rate s tha,
which induced the requirement for a flexible transition to "retire" older less capable AAW
escorts to convoy duty. Generally, for convoys, the threat, in terms of numbers and density,
was considered to be low. Conversely, the much increased potential threat to the SAC
underlies the requirement to construct billion dollar "state of the art" AAW cruisers and
destroyers [Ref. 23:p. 120]. In particular, the threat posed by anti-ship cruise missiles, while
currently serious, is rapidly escalating toward un-manageability from both the proliferation
of the nations possessing ASCMs and the increasing capabilities of the missiles produced.
It is not unreasonable to expect the capabilities of anti-ship missiles to continue grow with
respect to higher cruise and terminal velocities, lower detectability (reductions of radar cross
section and lower altitude flight) and the built-in capability to defeat active and passive
counter-measures (smart weapons). The Surface Action Group must be prepared to operate
in a high density "saturation" environment where an adversary could be expected to attempt
to overwhelm AAW defenses by attacking with a large number of closely spaced weapons.
Depth of Fire alone, as used as a measure of effectiveness in the convoy scenario, is not
sufficient to describe weapon system effectiveness in situations where an attempt at
saturation of the defense is a reasonable expectation. Thus, another analytical tool must be
applied in the Surface Action Group scenario.
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A. AAW EFFECTIVENESS THE SAG ENVIRONMENT
In the final analysis, the purpose of the airship is to allow the surface fleet survive to
accomplish its mission. The cost of providing a given level of survivability would be the
most direct measure of effectiveness, but is difficult to define analytically.
With the introduction of Aegis technology to the fleet the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics
Laboratory published a means for evaluating the effectiveness of carrier battle group AAW
defenses [Ref. 24]. The APL model utilizes defense in depth. AAW defenses are broken
down into the following categories:
a. "Outer defense zone" where coverage is provided by the aircraft carrier E2-C/fighter
aircraft.
b. "Inner defense zone" where the vicinity of the ships is covered by "area defense"
AAW cruisers and destroyers.
C. "Self defense zone" where short ranged "last chance" weapons are employed.
The concept is to measure the effectiveness of the carrier airwing in torms of the number
of AAW defense ships required to destroy leakers (successful penetrators) from the outer to
inner zones,
The substitution of the airship and alternatives for the carrier airwing was a logical and
appropriate step, the viability of the surface battle group without carrier or land based aircraft
is among the central issues of the "Revolution at Sea".
In formulating the APL model, the following information or assumptions about the total
AAW system are stated or implied:
a. The size of the enemy raid is given or an upper bound estimated.
b.The duration of the raid is given or bounds estimated.
c. The system overall probability of kill is represented by the probability of a single
missile destroying its intended target (single SAM Pk).
d.The number of times a ship can engage a target (depth of fire) is known or calculated
from the system parameters, and shall be at least 2. Vertical launch escorts may meet
the depth of fire requirement, of 2 engagement opportunities per target, by firing single
salvos of multiple SAMs.
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e.The area covered by an individual AAW ship is wide enough and the physical
disposition of the ships is such as to allow the assumption of symmetric loading of
the defenses. (Implicit Assumption)
Based on the previous, the maximum number of ASCM's that the entire AAW inner
defense force can successfully defend against is approximated as:
A =SAS X SP, [EQ. 1]
where;
A - the number of ASCM's which can be destroyed by the battle group AAW ships
SP = the number of AAW area defense ships
SAS = the number of ASCMs a single AAW ship can successfully engage from a
given type raid
and;
SAS = (ER X T) / EE, [EQ. 2]
where;
ER = the Engagement Rate of an individual ship
T = the Time available for engaging targets, for low flyers, essentially the raid
duration
EE = the average number of times a target is expected to be engaged (based on the
single SAM Pk)
When the above parameters are established, the number of AAW area defense ships
required to successfully defend against a given raid of specific duration may be plotted as is
shown in Figure 14. Here the assumption is made that each AAW ship may engage 10 targets
per minute with a depth of fire of at least 2. The model indicates a purely linear or additive
relationship exists between defensive ships with regard to the ability to counter the threat.
The implicit assumption of symmetric loading of the defenses is critical to the foregoing
assumption of linearity. The model requires the external estimation of the airwing's
effectiveness in "pre-filtering" the raid, For example, given a Combat Air Patrol effective-
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1 JH/APL AAW Area Defensive Etfectiveneus Model [Ref. 24]
Assumptions:
SAM P = 0.5
Maximum Engagemont Rate of at Single Escort - 10 ASCMs/minuta
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ASCMS ARRiVING AT [THE DNNR DEFENSIVE ZONE (Number of)
Figure 14. AAW Escort Requirements Based on Raid Size and Arrival Interval
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ness of 50% against a 60 A1•, v'l ý:d, the AAW escorts would be faced with a 30 missile raid,
For the level of AAW capability •.?,wwn in Figure 14 the requirement is established for at least
4 AAW escorts if the aircraft have not affected the ASCM arrival interval,
The value or effectiveness of the airwing is not only measured by how many missiles are
destroyed prior to the inner defensive zone. Perhaps even more important is the ability of
the fighter aircraft to influence the ASCM arrival interval. Referring once more to Figure
14, if the fighters can interfere with the attacker's command and control element to the extent
the missiles arrival interval Is forced from the initial assumption of I second to a 3 second
interval, while at the same time only destroying 10 of the 60 missiles, the net effect is to
reduce the Inner AAW defensive requirement from 4 to 2 AAW escorts.
B. WEAPON SYSTEM ASSUMPTIONS
It is pointed out in the APL paper that when all of the primary factors involved in an AAW
engagement are considered, the result will be a family of curves for each scenario, with each
curve depending on the variation of one of the factors. For the purpose of this analysis, the
following assumptions are made about the characteristics of the weapons systems in the
scenario,
1. Initial Threat Assumptions
a. the threat seen by the AAW area defense ships will be ASCMs launched beyond the
ships :adar horizon except for those missiles launched from tactical aircraft. ASCMs
from tactical aircraft will be launched inside of the ship's radar horizon to the attacking
aircraft, but after launch the missile will drop out of sight.
b. the ASCMs are low flyers which cruise at 50 feet or less, dropping to as little as 6 feet
in the terminal phase.
c. ASCM speeds will vary from Mach 1 to Mach 3. For computational purposes, missile
speed will be 10 times the Mach number, in nautical miles per minute.
d. the raid size is 60 ASCMs
e. launch platforms will be surface ships and bombers at ranges greater than 150 nautical
miles and tactical aircraft at from 60 to 30 nautical miles
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f. the radar cross section of targets' (for the "L" band frequency) will considered to be at
least (in square meters):
I. > 5.0 for tactical aircraft
2. > 0.75 for missiles capable of launch beyond 100 nm
3. > 0.25 for missiles capable of launch at 60 nm
4. > 0. 1 for missiles capable of launch at 30 nm
2. AAW Escort Assumptions
The primary AAW escorts are area defense cruisers employing the latest "state of the
art" technology, consisting of:
a. 3-D, frequency agile, phased array search radar
b. 100 vertical launch, semi-active homing Surface to Air Missiles of the Standard
missile family
c. support 24 missiles in-flight
d. 4 illuminators to support terminal homing
e. a fully automatic mode of operation allowing for SAM launch against a low flying
ASCM within 10 to 20 seconds of the target crossing the radar horizon,
f. Time required to determine if an intercept was successful and salvo additional SAMs
of 2 seconds.
g. a minimum SAM intercept range of between 2 and 6 nautical miles
h. SAMs employed will achieve an average velocity of between Mach 2 and Mach 3
within 5 nm from launch
With the above parameters fixed, and given:
a. the ship system's single SAM probability of destroying (P.) an engaged target is 0.95,
b. the AAW ship fires a 2 SAM salvo in each engagement (2 SAMs to meet DOF
requirement of model)
c. Each target is engaged independently of any other
The overall probability of a state of the art AAW escort destroying an engageable target,
during a single engagement, is 0.975.
I With rcs increasing with speed/range considerations.
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Secondary AAW escorts are cruisers and destroyers constructed in the 1960's but
"upgraded" in the late 70's and early 80's with the following capabilities:
a. mechanically rotated and scanned air search radars
b. mechanical dual rail launchers with a 1 or 2 launcher configuration (20 to 40 seconds
reload times)
c. 2 illuminators per launcher
d. threat reaction time of on the order of 30 seconds
e. minimum intercept range of 2 nautical miles
f. uses a Mach 3 variant of the Standard missile family, Extended Range, with interception
capabilities of on the order of 100 nautical miles
g. a magazine capacity of at least 60 SAMs
h. when modified, may operate with an airship to conduct over the horizon AAW
engagements
3. Airship System Assumptions
The characteristics and assumptions for the first generation airship, as delineated in
the airship system description, arc reiterated and further refined here.
The air search radar is based on the Westinghouse TPS-63. This radar operates in the
"L" band and has the capability to detect low flying fighter sized targets at ranges in excess
of 140 nautical miles and track small radar cross section target drones at ranges greater than
90 nautical miles at the airships 10,000 foot operating altitude.[Ref. 25] As a supplemental
air search system, inputs from all of the installed Hughes AWG-9, "X" band, search/fire
control radars are used.
The fire control system consists of:
a. from 2 to 12 AWG-9 systems, enhanced with 72 inch antennas
b. NTU fire control computers (2)
c. NTU missile communication systems (2)
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d. JrIDS, providing a dedicated control link to and from the airship to 2 NTU
configured AAW ships2
The following amplifying limitations apply:
a The airship can only control SAMs from NTU AAW ships with the dedicated
JTIDS/Remote Launch modifications.
b.To forestall jamming of the fire control link, reduce relative position errors and reduce
interception ambiguity, the airship must be within 25 nautical miles of the missile firing
ship.
c. Each missile control data link from ship to airship will support at most 12 SAMs at any
given time, iLe., the maximum number of missiles in flight given a link to 1 AAW ship
Is 12. If the airship is linked to 2 AAW ships, 24 missiles may be supported at any given
time against 12 targets. As the number of AWG-9 systems is increased, the number of
tracks engaged and number of missiles in flight will remain fixed at 12 and 24 respec
tively.
d.Terminal Engagement time required is 30 seconds.
e. Given the near term threat is not of reduced radar cross section, the airship detection
range is the horizon and detection of low flyers will occur at the radar horizon less 10%.
f. Fire control tracks/solutions will be determined by 10 nm after detection (no more than
20 additional scans on a Mach 1 target, i.e., from horizon to track is approximately 80-
120 seconds.)
g. the airship may operate at altitudes of at least 10,000 feet
With the above parameters fixed, and given:
a. the airship/AAW ship system's single SAM probability of destroying an engaged
target (Pk) is 0.5
b. the AAW ship fires a 2 SAM salvo in each engagement
Then assuming each target is engaged independently of any other and considering the
outcome of each SAM fired as an independent event, the overall probability of destroying
the target during a single engagement is 0.75.
2Alternatively the airship may drop one of the two possible AAW escorts from the link
to free one JTIDS channel for an airship-to-airship link. The airship-to-airship data link is
to allow for establishing fire control quality tracks from passive ESM cross bearings.
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It can be seen the distribution of targets destroyed by the airship/ NTU escort team is
a binomial random variable with the parameters:
P, the probability of success in any trial - 0.75
Q, the probability of failure in any trial = 0.25
N. the number of trials
Thus the expected number of successful interceptions is simply the expected value of the
binomial distribution:
E(lntercepts) - N x P, (EQ. 3]
with the variance:
Var(intercepts) w N x P x Q, [EQ. 4]
In this case, N is limited to engagements initiated outside of the AAW ships in
company's firing range and in any event, no engagements after the time of arrival of the first
enemy weapon at the airship or SAM firing ship's location. The first restriction is to prevenmt
counting engagements which are simultaneously those of the airship and another ship in thze
battle group. The second restriction, that of limiting the counting of engagements to the
"time on top" of the first enemy weapon, is to prevent considering interceptions performed.
after the airship and or SAM firing ship are subject to being damaged or destroyed. These
restrictions, while obviously understating the airship's capabilities, avoid the complication
of making the distributional assumptions required to support a Monte Carlo simulation.
C. WEAPON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE IN THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT
The goal is to estimate the limits of the single ship in the threat environment, The
saturation limit or "roll back" point is reached when the stream of inbound ASCMs has
moved the point of interception so close to the defending ship that the next missile in the
specified stream is inside of the ship's ability to successfully intercept, i.e., place the SAM
warhead close enough to the ASCM to be within the lethal radius. This minimum range is
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made up of a number of factors, often lumped together, some of which are quite variable,
others of which are more rigid. Among the more rigid is the mechanical performance of the
missile launch sequence. Many times the launch sequence limits alone are given as the
"minimum range" of the system. Considered in the launch sequence are questions ruch as;
What is the booster burn time? Can the missile start to turn toward the target while in boost
phase? If not, how long until it can? Additionally, for the vertical launch case, consideration
must be given to the time taken to pitch over from the vertical plane to direction of the ASCM.
These considerations factor together to determine where and when in space the missile will
be when ready to start homing. This may not be the minimum intercept point. Dealing with
a semi-active homing missile, some minimum amount of SAM terminal homing must take
place. The terminal homing phase may have some overlap with the launch sequence,
depending on when the seeker head of the SAM is free to search, but homing cannot
commence if there is no illuminator shining on the target. The value for terminal illumination
the shipboard fire control algorithm is using to control the firing sequence and illuminator
scheduling is critical. For a given minimum terminal homing time, the minimum range of
interception will also depend on the acceleration rate of the SAM in conjunction with the
velocity of the ASCM. Thus, the minimum interception range possible against an ASCM
becomes greater the higher the cruise missile's velocity. The point in time and space at which
the ship makes its last intercept depends on both illumination scheduling and the SAM time
of flight required. For this analysis, when the engagement under consideration is being
conducted by a surface escort alone, the criterion for determining if the engagement is
permissible will be illumination scheduling, to vary between 8 and 10 seconds, and a
minimum time of flight, from SAM launch to impact, to vary from the scheduled illuminator
period to 2 seconds over the scheduled illuminator period. When an engagement is
conducted utilizing the airship, the cutoff criterion will be when the engaged ASCM reaches
the range of first intercept of the firing surface escort or the ASCM passes out of the airship
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engagement envelope,
An upper bound on the possible number of engagements is generated for the weapons
systems by considering the physical limitations associated with the systems just described
verses the threat parameters and the cutoff criterion. The variable input factors are:
a. ASCM and SAM velocities
b. ASCM and Radar heights above water (for determination of the range of target
detection and the open fire range of the AAW escort)
c. the maximum number of missiles in flight
d. the number of launchers and their reloading time
e. the number of illuminators available
D. ANALYSIS
An electronic spreadsheet application has been created to allow evaluation of impact of
varying the above parameters of interception (see Appendix A, p. 102, for details on
spreadsheet implementation). The result is a complete time sequenced record of events from
the raid crossing the appropriate weapons systems radar horizon and extending to the last
ASCM's arrival.3 Only simple interception geometries are considered. The raid is an
undefined stream with the target spacing set so as to provide the raid duration desired. No
particular assumption is made as to the "shape" of the raid. As far as the model is concerned,
the ASCMs could be inbound from sixty different directions. For a raid of 60 ASCMs of 1
minute duration, target spacing (interarrival time) is 1 second. If tactical aircraft are required
to close to within engagement range to target and fire ASCMs, a limitation no more than 2
missiles per aircraft is imposed. The 2 missile restriction then requires 30 tactical aircraft
3The spreadsheet used in this analysis is a deterministic calculation of the saturation limit
of the weapon systems modeled. Most advanced spreadsheet generators including the one
used here, have a random number generation capability. With very slight modification to the
listing in Appendix A, a complete discrete event Monte Carlo simulation is possible. This
assumes, of course, the user has valid probability distributions for the input parameters.
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with a 2 second spacing to deliver the raid of 1 minute duration. The 2 missile limit is only
a constraint on the airship/NTU ship performance.
The electronic spreadsheet output is examined to determine when any "criterion" (see
page 57) for the particular scenario has been violated. It should be noted, on any particular
run, several criteria may have been violated, each at different number of intercept opponu-
nities. By design of the program, the values determined from the spreadsheet output in
surface-ship-only scenarios are equivalent to the value of the single AAW ship (SAS)
Performance calculated by (EQ. 2) in the AAW effectiveness model. The successful
engagements generated in airship assisted scenarios are used to reduce the raid size in the
effectiveness model.
1. Generation Of Model Input For Airship Performance (When Combined With
Older AAW Escorts)
For the preliminary analysis 2 airship configurations are considered. The first configu-
ration is the same as used in the convoy analysis, that of an airship with 2 AWG-9 systems,
The second configuration considered will be an airship of increased displacement carrying
4 AWG-9 systems.
The threat scenarios considered in the airship supported engagements include the
"reasonable near term" threat characteristics as well as threats which are entirely theoretical,
in that no regard has been given to the physical plausibility of the particular combinations of
ranges and speeds. We wish merely to establish what are liklty to be the broad bounds of
airship performance. Table 9 shows the basic results of 18 different threat variations. These
variations range from 30 Mach 1 aircraft, firing 60 Mach 1 ASCMs at 30 nm over 1 minute,
to 60 Mach 3 ASCMs, launcbed in excess of 150 nm., with zero second spacing, against 3
airship (2 illuminator)/escort combinations (output, representative of many of the scenarios,
will be found in Appendix A, p. 119). Table 9 lists the expected number of surviving cruise




ASCMS EXPECTED TO SURVIVE TO AAW IN NER DEFENSE ZONE
(When 2 Illuminator Airship Is Employed)
Outer 1 Airship I Airship I Airship
Defensive I AAW Ship I AAW Ship 2 AAW Ships
Zone 1 Launcher 2 Launchers 4 Launchers
Configeration: 2 Rails 4 Rails 8 Rails
6 Trncks 6 Tracks 12 Tracks
12 SAMS 12 SAMS 24 SAMV4S
Threat:
30AJC @Ml,
2 sc interval Expocted Surviving ASCMs
with:
60 ASCMS@ M 60 nm launch 45 32 29
60 ASCMS @M2 60 nm launch 46 41 35
60 ASCMS @ M3 60 nm launch 46 42 36
d0 ASCMS @ M 30 nm launch 36 21 12
60 ASCMS @M2 30 nm launch 38 24 14
60 ASCMS @M3 30 nm launch 38 24 14
30 A/ @ M1, 0 second interval with:
60 ASCMS @ M1 60 nm launch 45 38 33
60 ASCMS @M2 60 nm launch 45 43 38
60 ASCMS @M3 60 nm launch 46 44 39
60 ASCMS @M1 30 nm launch 46 35 15
60 ASCMS @M2 30 nm launch 48 37 17
60 ASCMS @ M3 30 nm launch 39 37 17
OTH ASCMS, 1 second interval
60 ASCMS @ MI 46 43 32
60 ASCMS @M2 52 50 49
60 ASCMS @ M3 55 52 53
OTH ASCMS, 0 second Interval
60 ASCMS @ MI 47 43 38
60 ASCMS @ M2 52 51 50
60 ASCMS@ M3 55 54 54
Assumptions: tingle SAM P. is 0,5, 2 SAM salvos, targets are at 25 ft,, airship and NTU escort(s) are
essentially co-located, airship altitude is 10,000 ft.
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In the case of the 2 illuminator airship, when working with a single launcher AAW
escort, the reload time of the surface ship and the limited number of airship illuminators are
the controlling factors in the number of engagements possible. When the 2 illuminator
airship is linked to a double launcher configured surface escort, effectively reducing the
inter-salvo timn by half, the number of ASCMs surviving to engage the surface escort screen
is only slightly decreased. The controlling factor for the engagement is the number of
illuminators and illuminator availability. By comparison, Tabl•c 10 shu,,vs the additional 30
to 40% threat reduction expected from a 4 illuminator airship compared to the 2 illuminator
airship.
TABLE 10
REDUCTION OF ATTACKING FORCES EXPECTED WITH 2 AND
4 ILLUMINATOR AIRSHIPS
(Airship Linked With 2 NTU Escorts)
Airship with: 2 Illuminators: 4 Illuminators
% Reduction
Long range ASCMs 47 75
Medium range ASCMs (< 60 nm) 40-52 78
Short range ASCMs (<30nm) 72-75 100
Aircraft penetrating to 60 nmn 35 58
Aircraft penetrating to 30 nrn 60 95-100
Based oxn Table 9 scenarios where the maximum velocity for long and medium range low
flying ASCMs was, respectively, Mach I or Mach 2.
Assumptions: Escorts provide a total of 4 twin rail launchers, a single SAM Pkof 0.5, 2 SAM
salvos, targets (30 aircraft and or 60 ASCMs) are at 25 ft., airship and NTU escort(s) arc
essentially co-located, airship altitude is 10,000 ft.
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2. Generation Of Model Input For AAW Escort Performance
The next level of assessment evaluates how well the "state of the art" and "updated
old ship" will perform in the face of the proposed threat in a stand alone mode, i.e., without
airship based surveillance and fire control systems. For the sake of brevity, the threat
scenarios will be reduced from the theoretical, to the plausible near term threat. With regard
to plausibility, Mach 3 and Mach 2 "sea skimming" ASCMs will be allowed to stretch the
upper bound but will be limited to launch ranges on the order of 30 and 60 nautical miles,
respectively. With these constraints in mind, the capability of the surface fleet to deal with
the threat is examined.
Over the range of reaction times and reload times assumed for the "Older AAW
escorts" very little capability exists against low flying ASCMs even at the most optimistic
threat levels. Based on this, older AAW escorts are dropped from the analysis in a stand
alone role, For state of the art AAW escorts, Tables 11 and 12 are a compilation of the
saturation limits of the unassisted surface escort spreadsheet scenarios, when the escort is
using a Mach 2.5 SAM with an 8 second illuminator scheduling interval. Cruise missiles,
I second apart, at an altitude of 25 feet are used for the scenarios in Table 11 while missiles
at an altitude of 6 feet are used in Table 12. The results obtained are averaged between the
8 second and 10 second time of flight criterion and the results plotted in Figures 15 and 16
for the 25 foot and 6 foot ASCM heights respectively. The results are then averaged between
the 25 and 6 foot ASCM heights. The process has been repeated for Mach 2 and Mach 3
SAMs with the results plotted as the average performance of the state of the art AAW escort,
with the SAM performance indicated, in Figure 17. The values from Figure 17 are then used
as the AAW escort input into the effectiveness model as the values for (EQ. 2). Figure 18
presents the results of repeating the entire above process for the ten to 12 second minimum
time of flight criterion.
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TABLE 11
ASCMS REQUIRED TO SATURATE "State of the Art" AAW ESCORTS
(ASCMs at 25 feet)
Nuanber of ASCMs Engaged Prior to Saturation
Threat @ Mach
Constraint
Violated 1 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Reaction Delay - 10 seconds
TOF< 8 30+ 28 20 10 8
TOF< 10 30+ 20 12 8 4
Reaction Delay = 15 seconds
TOF< 8 30+ 24 16 6 2
TOF< 10 30+ 20 12 - 0
Reaction Delay = 20 seconds
TOF< 8 30+ 24 12 4 2
TOF< 10 30+ 16 8 0 0
Assumptions: 60 ASCMs, Over the Horizon launch, 1 second spacing. Escorts with vertical
launch, Mach 2.5 SAMs, illumination scheduled at 8 seconds.
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TABLE 12
ASCMS REQUIRED TO SATURATE "State of the Art" AAW ESCORTS
(ASCMs at 6 feet)
Number of ASCMs Engaged Prior to Saturation
,_ _THREAT 0 Magh
Constraint
Violated 1 1.5 210 2.5 3.0
Reaction Delay = 10 seconds
TOF< 8 30+ 20 12 8 4
TOF< 10 28 12 8 4 2
Reaction Delay = 15 seconds
TOF< 8 30+ 20 12 6 2
TOF< 10 24 12 4 2 0
Reaction Delay = 20 seconds
TOF< 8 28 16 8 4 2
TOF< 10 20 8 4 0 0
Assumptions: 60 ASCMs, Over the Horizon launch, 1 second spacing. Escorts with vertical
launch, Mach 2.5 SAMs, illumination scheduled at 8 seconds.
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"State of the Art" AAW Eacort Stand Alone Performance
Assumptions:
ASCM @ 25 ft, I second spacing
Search Radar Height m 75ft
SAM Average Velocity a Mach 2.530 SAM Time of Flight between 8 to 10 seconds
Illuminator Interval - 8 seconds
No Damage Assesment delay
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Figure 15. Saturation Level for AAW Escorts Against ASCMs at 25 feet
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"State of the Art" AAW EucAmr Stand Aone hrfornmnce
Asumptions:
30 -ASCM f ft. I second spacing\ ~Search iPldli H'eilht = 75 ft
SAM Average Velocity a Mach 2A
,S;AM Time of Pjht between 3 to 10 seconds
Mmmnmor Inte-val 8 seconds
No Damape Assesment delay








1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
ASCM VEWCTY (Mach)
Figure 16. Saturation Level for AAW Escorts Against ASCMs at 6 feet
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AVERAGE "STATE OF THE ART' AAW ESCORT STAND ALONE
PERFORMANCE BASBD ON SAM AVERAGE VELOCITY
ASSUMPTIONS:
Search Radar Height - 75 feet
SAM AVERAGE VELOCITY as Indicated
Illumina, Interval - 8 seconds
ASCM Height bnetween 6 to 25 feet
SAM time of flight between 8 to 10 seconds
Fire control delay between 10 to 20 seconds
No damage assessment delay (SAM Pk. 1)
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ASCM VELOCITY (Mach)
Figure 17. Average Saturation Level for AAW Escorts Utilizing 8 Second Illuminator Scheduling
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State of the Art Escorts
Search Radar Height m 75 ft
SAM Average Velocity a Mach 2.5, by 5 nm
SAM Time of Flight between 8 to 10 seccnds
Fire Control Delay (FCD) between 10 to 20 ,econds
NO DAMAGE ASSESMENT Delay (SAM PI K )
ASCMHeight between 6 to 25 feet









1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
ASCM VELOCITY (Mach)
Figure 18. Average Saturation Level for AAW Escorts Utilizing 10 Second Illuminator Scheduting
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Examination of data indicates the illuminator constraints found in the previous
airship results, also predominate in the surface escort case. The net result, due to the limited
time available to counter ASCMs at a 1 second spacing, is the AAW ship suffers a serious
decline in firepower at threat velocities above Mach 1.5, across a wide variation of SAM
velocities, reaction times and illuminator schedules.
E. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS FROM THE EFFECTIVENESS MODEL
When the aforementioned (Figures 17 and 18) values for the performance of state of the
art AAW escorts are considered, the high sensitivity of AAW escort performance to SAM
verses ASCM average velocity is apparent.
Combining the results of first allowing the airship/older AAW escorts to "filter" the 60
ASCM raid with the, more favorable to the state of the art AAW escort, values of Figure 17
results in the comparison, shown in Figures 19 and 20, of the value of adding the airship to
the battle group.
1. The Significance Of The Results
Based then on the effectiveness model the following assessments can be made.
Assuming a Mach 1.5 or greater ASCM threat, and given the state of the art AAW escort is
using either a Mach 2.5 ora Mach 3.0 SAM, the battle group utilizing a 2 illuminator airship
requires fewer ship assets than a purely state of the art escort equipped battle group. In terms
of escort hulls required, the 4 illuminator airship is equal or superior at all ASCM threat
velocities. At threat velocities of Mach 2 or higher, battle groups without the airship/NTU
AAW escort team suffer a 3-to-I disadvantage in ,'scorts required.
2. Impact Of The Model Linearity Assumption
The most striking element of the low flying ASCM threat is the "time compression"
effect. A basic assumption of the model is symmetric loading of the defenses. The point of
69
Assumptions:
ASCM @ 6 to 25t, I mecond pacing
Search Radar Height - 75 ft
SAM Time of Flight between 8 to 10 seconds
Uluminator Intervul a u scm-d
No Damage Assesment delay
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Figure 19. Escort Requred, With/Without Airship, "SOA" Escos Using Mach 2.5 SAMs
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Assul tions:
60 ASCMs @6 to 25 ft, I s spacing, lauched @ 30 cm
State of the Art Esccwt
Search Radar Height - 75 ft
SAM Averae Viocity a Mach 3.0, by 5 am
SAM Time oi Flight between 8 to 10sconds
lluminator Interval a 8 seconwd
No Damage Alsese•lnt delay
Fire Control Delay (FMD) between 10 to 20 seconds
20-
16 SAG Escorts Include:
E State of the Art Escorts only
Alrshlp (2 Illuminator) and 2 NTU Escorts
Arshlp (4 lumlnator) and 2 NTU Escorts
8
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1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
ASCM VELOCIrY (Mach)
Figure 20. Escorts Required, With/Without Airship, "SOA" Escorts Using Mach 3.0 SAMs
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lc% flying missiles is aimed specifically at invalidating this assumption in the "real" world.
In the cage of high flying high speed missiles, the defending ships have the opportunity to
interact so us to prevent any single ship from having to deal with a disproportionate
percentage of the iaid. The high flyer affords the opportunity of several minutes in which
to bring all defenses to the highest state of readiness, to make target assignments, to make
assessments of engagements and to re-engage as required. The low flying ASCM seriously
limits the battle group ability to perform these basic tasks. A high flying raid of 60 missiles
would be revealed several hundred miles prior to its arrival, Assuming a compact disposition
of AAW ships of 10 to 20 nm, the time difference between disclosure of the raid to the first
ship to disclosure to the last ship in the group, would be 1 or 2 minutes. In the case of the low
flying missile, the time difference betwetn the first ship detecting the raid and the next
nearest ship would only be the matter of a few seconds. These few seconds against a low
flying raid are potentially more significant than the entire first-to-last differential of the high
flying raid. No matter the launching mode or range, the high speed ASCM is the most
stressful. The only practical near term methods of delivering the Mach 3 sea skimmer would
appear to be close-in aircraft and submarines.
Because the launching rate of submarines is likely to be low (relative to a 1 second
spacing), the tactical aircraft is considered the worst case threat, Consider that attack aircraft
will use short range ASCMs in a completely different manner than that used in targeting long
range low flyers. The short range ASCM missile seeker can be, used only to "zero out" the
minor fuing errors in an essentially straight shot, rather than using the seeker to "search",
thus allowing the concentration of weapons at a narrow front. The possibilities or options
available to the attacker become critical. The attack leader may elect to make use of a
relatively slow and high, fuel efficient flight profile. The limiting factor will be the AAW
ship missile envelope to horizon profile. The overall effect will be to dramatically increase
the attackers loiter time near the ships. Additional time is gained for the attacker by not
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having to maintain high speed while loitering at, 500 feet at 50 nm. The raid may stay well
below the surface groups horizon while arching around to an optimal strike position. With
the shipboard fire control/search radar at 75 feet, attack aircraft at 500 feet come into view
at 38.6 nm. Assuming an instant shipboard reaction when the aircraft pops up, a semi-active
homing SAM at Mach 3 will take well in excess of 1 minute to arrive. This gives the attack
pilot 45 seconds to scout/probe the victim and more than 30 seconds to gently descend 100
to 200 feet, rendering the SAM useless.4 Under the same conditions, an aircraft at 250 feet
will "pop-up" on shipboard radar at about 30 nm, still more than a minute from a possible
intercept. It would seem likely attacking aircraft could deliver a strike with minimal losses.
Further options presented by the attacker's position are:
a. the ability to attack from any azimuth
b. operate escort jammers very close to the point(s) of attack(s)
c. bring the standoff jammer in close (40 nim)
d. attack and jam from one direction while attempting to jam the SAM uplink and rear
reference signals from the opposite direction,
For the sea skimming ASCM the following additional assumptions must be made, if
the linearity assumption of the effectiveness model is to hold:
a. defending ships, at the point of attack, have enough warning to position so as to have
all illuminators on the engaged axis.
b. All other defending ships, to be counted as effectively supporting the model assump-
tions, must have a clear field of fire from the horizon to within 1 nautical mile of the
ship(s) at the point of attack(s).
However, even with the assumption of a much improved AAW escort reaction time,
the case for the additive nature of AAW area defense is difficult to defend, when sea
4In an attack, the aircraft will be forced more deeply into the surface escort's engagement
zone. Under such conditions, and assuming the aircraft's speed is less than approximately
0.85 Mach, the attacker will have nearly the same time available as the scout, but the post
launch maneuvers required for SAM avoidance could not be described as "Gentle". As the
attacker is forced to use a higher velocity, to limit exposure to airship directed SAMs, his
vulerability is much increased.
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skimming ASCMs are delivered at close range by low flying tactical aircraft. The physical
position of each ship's illuminators is frozen (time to unmask) by the short duration of the
attack. In addition, the forward escorts will tend to screen the raid from the rearward units
and a clean field of fire cannot be guaranteed. In a word, a model which contains an inplict
assumption of a linear or additive characteristic in AAW defense must also be considered to
have an implied assumption of a high altitude threat or at least the assumption that the low
flying threats are launched at such a range so as to require a substantial "search", producing
arandom, broad distribution of the threat across the AAW defensive area. At best then, the
effectiveness model is quite conservative in describing relative airship effectiveness, when
the attack on the battle group is by tactical aircraft,
F. ADDITIONAL AIRSHIP EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES
It is clear the vulnerability of the surface escorts is a function of the ASCM arrival
interval. If the ASCMs arrive at an interval of 3 seconds or more, 2 to 4 "state of the art"
AAW escorts with Mach 3 SAMs will handle the entire 60 missile raid. The vital question
is how the surface battle group may influence the raid interarrival intorval. Rather than
consider the 1 second ASCM arrival interval as the most severe threat, consider it the best
that can be hoped for while being attacked, at close range, by an enemy who intends the
ASCM interarrival interval to be zero. Here it is seen, the surface battle group can have no
influence on the arrival interval, the outcome is dependent only on the enemy's execution.
The past decisions by the opposition on weapons procurement and pilot training, as
conditioned by environmental influences at the moment of attack, will decide the actual
distribution of ASCMs seen by the AAW area defenses. With this in mind, the saturation data
is re-examined against a parameterized enemy probability of success.
The value obtained for an individual ship's saturation limit is considered, with the
addition of I AS CM, as the number of ASCMs the opposition must attempt to launch in order
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to achieve one "mission kill" against the surface battle group. The number of missiles
required for a single opportunity is divided into the 60 missiles available in the raid, If the
enemy has a given probability of converting an attack opportunity into at least the I second
arrival rate of ASCMs while attempting a zero interarrival interval, then the probability of
successful conversion times the number of possible opportunities gives the expected number
of "kills". Figures 21 and 22 show the results of the above calculations when the enemy skill
level and environmental conditions give a successful probability of conversion from 0.1 to
0.75. The assumption is the AAW escorts have either a Mach 2.0 or 2.5 SAM. If the number
of escorts is 8, then even with Mach 1.5 ASCMs, the opposition can expect to score a mission
kill on a battle group ship on every raid. Considering the low expected attrition rate ofenemy
attack aircraft, if the opposition has the missile assets, several raids could reduce the battle
group to the extent to preclude carrying out the primary mission task,
By introducing the airship the number of expected mission kills is dramatically reduced.
Figure 23 reconsiders the scenario for state of the art AAW escorts with Mach 2.5 SAMs
supported by a 2 illuminator Airship and 2 NTU escorts. Note the 2 illuminator airship
significantly reduces the probability that any escort suffers a mission kill. One additional
curve is added to Figure 23 to represent increasing the airship illuminators to 4. With 4
illuminators, the expected number of ships subjected to a mission kill, by a tactical aircraft
raid, drops to zero.
Two additional aspects of the raid when an airship is used have to be considered. The
first is the ability of the airship to interfere with the enemy's ability to achieve the 1 second
ASCM spacing. With harassing fire certain from 100 nm in to the launch point, the attacker
will want to spend as little time as possible in the area. The ensuing high speed transit will
burn fuel at an elevated rate. The higher rate of fuel consumption will have an adverse effect
on the time the attacker has available to exercise the command and control functions required
to coordinate an attack with a high probability of success. The second additional aspect is
the level of attrition indicated for the attacking aircraft. Even considering the variance of the
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Figure 21. Expected Mission Kills with MWch 2.0 SAMs Against a 60 ASCM Raid
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Figure 22. Expected Mission Kill1s with Mach 2.5 SAMs Alzainst a 60 ASCM Raid
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model, the losses reduce the probability of re-attack dramatically.
This assessment indicates the addition of an airship in a surface force will reduce the
expected number of Casualties to first line AAW ships to a level at which the primary mission
accomplishment is not at risk to attack aircraft. Among the threats, the airship is most
effective when dealing with aircraft, primarily resulting from the multiple kill effect
achieved by interceptions on attacking aircraft prior to their reaching the ASCM launch
point. Long range ASCMs and the effect of more adverse assumptions are examined in the
sensitivity analysis following.
G. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The most significant factors controlling the firepower of the airship/NTU escorts are the
altitude of the airship, the number of target illuminators, the range of the SAM employed
and the constraints of the number of SAMs in flight. The number of SAMs in flight is
controlled by the maximum number of missiles supported by the overall fire control system
(i.e., the combined airship/NTU escort system) and the firing rate of the escort ships.
The intercept opportunities for 3 airship configurations with 4, 6 and 12 illuminators
respectively, have been generated for airship operating altitudes of 10,000, 5,000 and 2,000
feet. The results are shown in Table 13.
From Tabl 13 it can be seen that increasing the number of illuminators from 4 to 6 only
increases firepower slightly and further increases from 6 to 12 illuminators offers no
increased firepower. This result develops from the fact that the maximum number of missiles
in flight is reached very early in all 3 cases. Because the time of flight of the SAM's is very
long compared to the 30 second terminal engagement phase, 12 illuminators show no utility
over 6. The value of 12 illuminators would start to increase, in the scenarios, as the length
of the terminal engagement phase increased or if the scenario were extended to allow the
airship to count short range interceptions after the time of arrival of the first ASCM.
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TABLE 13
AIRSHIP/NTUJ ESCORT ASCMS INTERCEPTION OPPORTUNITIES
(Dual SAM Salvos)
Airship Configuration
4 Illuminators 6 Illuminators 12 Illuminators
Threat:
Airship @ 10,000 feet 80 second delay
30 A/C with ASCMs @ 30 nn. 42 46 46
30 A/C with ASCMs @ 60 nm. 24 24 24
60 Mach I ASCMs 60 60 60
60 Mach 2 ASCMs 24 32 34
60 Mach 3 ASCMs 12 18 26
Airship @ 5,000 feet 30 second delay
30 A/C with ASCMs @ 30 nm. 30 30 34
30 A/C with ASCMs @ 60 nm 8 12 12.
60 Mach I ASCMs 52 60 60
60 Mach 2 ASCMs 20 28 28
60 Mach 3 ASCMs 8 16 20
Airship @ 2,000 feet 30 second delay
30 A/C with ASCMs @ 30 rim. 16 20 20
30 A/C with ASCMs @ 60 nm. 0 0 0
60 Mach I ASCMs 28 28 28
60 Mach 2 ASCMs 10 14 14
60 Mach 3 ASCMs 5 8 8
Assumptions: ASCMs at 1 second spacing, aircraft at 2 second intervals, 2 NTU AAW
escorts with Mach 3 SAMs, linked to airship.
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The effect of lowering the airship operating altitude reduces the airships radar horizon,
in turn reducing the range of detection and earliest possible interception. In descending from
10,000 to 5,000 feet, the radar horizon is reduced from approximately 130 nm to 95 nm. This
reduction in operating altitude results in the earliest possible interception being reduced from
88 nm to 67 nm with the assumed Mach 3 SAM (30 second delay). This result would also
hold if the maximum range of the available SAM were on the ornlcr of 70 nm vice the 100
nm range assumed in the scenarios. The effect on firepower of reducing the airship operating
altitude is strong, but not as strong as might have been thought. Reducing the operating
altitude by half reduces firepower by about one third. With any of the airship illuminator
configurations, descending from 10,000 to 5,000 feet still allows for engagements on all of
the 30 aircraft closing to 30 nm while allowing for engagements on a third of the 30 aircraft
closing to 60 nm. The most significant effect is seen in the descent from 5,000 to 2,000 feet.
Although a majority of aircraft closing to 30 nm are still brought under fire, the airship would
have no capability on aircraft launching an attack from 60 nm. Assuming aircraft at 60 nm
can launch Mach 2 capable ASCMs, the number of airships and NTU escorts would have to
increase by a factor of 3 to adequately deal with the threat.
Under the restrictions imposed in the scenario's, 2 NTU escorts are required to achieve
maximum firepower. The maximum capabilities of 2 NTU escorts are not being reached.
With the assumption of 4 dual rail launchers with reload times between 25 and 35 seconds,
the combined system is capable of launching a SAM every 3 to 5 seconds. The constraint
of dual SAM salvos, in the scenarios, was designed to ensure a reasonable probability of kill
at the long ranges where the kinetic enmrgy of the SAMs would be low and the uncertainty
due to system measurement enrors would be high. Clearly, as the range from the airship to
the target decreases, the need for dual SAM salvos also decreases. In Table 14 the restriction
to dual SAM salvos is relaxed for the 5,000 and 2,000 foot operating altitudes. The maximum
number of SAMs in flight remains 24.
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TABLE 14
AIRSHIP INTERCEPT OPPORTUNITIES WITH SINGLE SAM SALVOS
Airship @ 5,000 feet
4 Illuminators 6 Illuminators 12 Illuminators
Threat:
30 A/C with ASCMs @ 30 nm. 32 56 60
30 A/C with ASCMs @ 60 nm. 8 18 24
60 Mach 1 ASCMs 52 60 60
60 Mach 2 ASCMs 20 30 60
60 Mach 3 ASCMs 0 18 44
Airship @ 2,000 feet
4 Illuminators 6 Illuminators 12 Illuminators
30 A/C with ASCMs @ 30 nm. 16 30 30.
30 A/C with ASCMs @ 60 nm. 0 0 0
60 Mach I ASCMs 28 43 60
60 Mach 2 ASCMs 10 18 40
60 Mach 3 ASCMs 6 10 20
Assumptions: ASCMs at 1 second spacing, aircraft at 2 second intervals, 2 NTU AAW
escorts with Mach 3 SAMs, linked to airship, 30 second fire control system delay.
As aresultof shifting to single SAM salvos, firepower at the closer ranges, assuming the
engagement Pk remains the same, is greatly enhanced with either 6 or 12 illuminators.
However, no significant increase in firepower is seen in the 4 illuminator case because
illuminator tie-up has become the controlling factor. With 6 or 12 illuminators and the
airship operating at the 2,000 foot level, the airship/NTU escort team can be expected to
significantly reduce the threat to the SAG.
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1. Airship Survivability
Based on the large visual signature and relatively slow speed of the airship, it could
argued that airships would be too vulnerable to be usefld in combat. It might be simple to
just fly in and gun down the airship at close range. This argument does not give close
consideration to the capabilities of the modem "state of the art" AAW escort. WLen such an
escort is not plagued, as it has been in this study, by low-flying ASCMs the firepower
generated is unequaled. The airship operates in airspace which is the prime killing ground
for modem AAW area defense escorts. As a comparison, a scenario is proposed where the
opposition chooses to use 20 of its 60 missiles to attack the airship while allotting the
remaining 40 to high velocity, aircraft launched ASCMs. Assume the theoretical Anti-
Airship Cruise Missile (AACM) has solved the unique airship targeting and fusing problems
[Ref. 26:pp. 60-63]. Also assume the AACMs are "locked on" and launched from long
range (+200 nm), with an average velocity of Mach 2.5. The defensive situation is assumed
to be a 4 illuminator airship at 10,000 feet and 2 NTU escorts accompanying 4 "state of the
art" escorts all using long range Mach 3 SAMs. The results from this scenario are that the
combined "state of the art" escorts (40 second delay, see Appendix A, p. 118 for other
assumptions) achieve a DOF of 4 on every anti-airship missile prior to the first such missile
coming within 50 nm of the airship, while the airship/NTU escort combination (with a 0.5
single SAM probability of kill) destroy all of the other 20 attacking aircraft! Of all of the
threats faced by a surface force, 3 of the most significant are of no threat to the airship. These
threats being, low-flying ASCMs, torpedoes and mines. Based on these considerations, and
its defensibility by reason of position, the threat to airship survival, compared to any other
unit in the surface force, would have to be considered lower overall.
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V. COST ANALYSIS
The objective of the cost analysis is to determine a reasonable estimate of the financial
requirements to acquire, operate and maintain the fleet of airships described in the convoy
and surface action group scenarios, over the 30 year lifetime of the system, so as to allow a
comparison of the airship with alternatives. The analysis is broken into the following five
main areas:
a. The costs of acquiring the base line 2.5 mcf airship exclusive of the combat system. The
cost estimated covers the airframe or hull, propulsion and flight avionics and associated
subsystems to, essentially, create a ready to float vehicle. The combat system or mission
payload, which is costed separately, is the air and surface search radars, the fire control
radars , communication suite and the associated computers, interfaces, controls and
displays required to make the airship "operational".
b. The marginal tm.st of increasing the size of the hull to accommodate increasing the
payload from the 25,000 pounds of the 2.5 mcf airship to 35,000 pounds in the 3.5 mcf
airship.
c. Combat system costs, sometimes referred to as mission payload or mission avionics.
Costs are estimated for the "common" avionics to be installed in all three variants, then,
separate costs are calculated for the fire control system required for two to twelve
illuminators.
d. Operating and Support costs for the entire airship system.
e. The cost of support equipment, facilities and initial spares. The above costs are prorated
to estimate the life cycle cost of the system.
A. HULL COSTS
In arriving at an estimate for airship costs, a cost estimating relationship developed from
historical data by the analysis firm of J.W. Noah and Associates [Ref. 27] is utilized.[Ref.
28] The 1987 U.S.Navy contract with Westinghouse/Airship Industries for an Operational
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Development Model airship (ODM) is used, inconjuction with learning curve theory (Ref.
29:p. 93], to validate the J.W. Noah (JWN) C.E.R, The WAI contract called for conducting
the research and development, design, construction and testing of one airship displacing 2,3
million cubic feet for a fixed price of $169 million including a $51 million (FY87$)
subcontract to Grumman for radar developmnnt work. The 1987 contract also made
provision for the purchase of up to five additional airship airframes of the same design for
a price of $294 million or a single additional airship for $83 miliion,[Ref. 19 :p. 904]
1. C.E.R. For Airship Costs
The JW, Noah and Associates studies previously -eferenced, developed thde follow-
ing CE.Rs for estimating Airship production costs:
a, Initial RTD&E costs will be 2 times the first unit cost
b. Airship Hull costs represent 95% of the total cost with Propulsion and Flight Avionics
taking the remainder
c, First unit cost are found from EQ. I as:
Y = 0.000239 x S2.61 x D '33, [EQ. 1]
where,
Y = first unit cost, FY77M$
S = maximum speed, knots
D = air displacement, m.c.f.
,= .82, s.e.e = .317
(see Appendix B, p 131 for Predicted vs Actual Costs)
d. the learning curve factor' for Hull production Is 0.83
Using the WAI contract as a benchmark, the assumption iý made that the 5 additional
'Batchelder [Ref. 2 9 :p. 1161 lists a mean learning curve of 0.75 for 25 military aircraft,
based on 1966 data.
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airships allowed for are the first production lots of the 20 airships required in the proposed
system. Using this assumption allows use of the cost estimating techniques of Batchelder
[Ref. 29:p. 93-120] to work backward to separate the first unit cost from the research,
development and test and evaluation costs covered in the initial contract, and then to continue
forward to estimate the final production cost of 20 units. The methodology assumes the cost
figures used represent the "costs of production". The contract figurs, on the other hand, are
the costs of production and, assuming WAI is responsible to it. stockholders, an unknown
amount of profit. To consider the effect of the commingled funds, the following assumptions
apply:
a. The initial RDT&E contract for $169 million stands alone ($118 million less radar).The
company would prefer to at least break even, but would accept moderate losses in
expectation of future profits.
b. The government is not obligated to buy any follow on airships, but at its own option may
order from one to five. Under this requirement, the assumption is made that WAL
intends to "break even" on their investment on the first or second production unit,
otherwise the firm could bc locked into a significant loss.
With the above assumptions, the proposed cost estimating relationships, in order to
be considered valid, should show the potential for WAI to profit from the 1987 contracts but
should not allow for an excessive profit.
2. Airship Costs Based On C.E.R.S
Based on the requirements for a 2.3 mcf airship with a maximum velocity of 90 knots,
the JWN estimate, corrected for inflation, results in a first unit cost of $75.16 million in
FY87$ [Ref. 30]. The total cost of hull production is found from EQ. 2 [Ref. 29:p. 98] as:
Total Hull Cost = a X(+), [EQ. 2]
where:
a = first unit Hull Cost
b - Learning Curve factor
X = Hull units produced to date
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The resulting cost for producing six hulls is $278.6 million (FY87$). Estimating the
propulsion/avionics costs as 5% of hull costs gives a cost of $15 million. Using the factor
of two for RDT&E costs over first unit costs results in a RDT&E cost of $150 million. The
total cost of producing six "float-away" airships is rounded to $443 million (FY87$). The
total funding available for producing the six airships by the WAI contract is $412.4 million
(FY87$). The difference, a loss of $30.4 million, is substantial. From the cost of producing
six airships by the JWN CERs, it must be assumed either WAI intends to lose a lot of money,
WAI has made a technological break through, or one or more of the CERs fail to properly
consider a variable. Believing the latter, the IWN estimating relationships are reexamined.
Profitability in the initial WAI contract Is strongly influenced by the ratio of RDT&E
costs to first unit costs, If the RDT&E ratio exceeds one by a significant amount no profit
can be achieved in the WAI contract unless first unit costs are extremely low. JWN
concluded that due to lack of airship RDT&E data, the RDT&E ratio of cargo aircraft, on the
order of two to one, could be used as an approximation [Ref. 27:p. 6]. The ratio of RDT&E
costs to first unit costs used in the above calculation was two. But Lancaster [Ref. 31 :p. I-
25 ] counters that the RDT&E cost ratio foi airships which do not significantly challenge the
state of the art should be on the order of one. The MWN figure relies entirely on complex
fixed-wing aircraft costs and includes many designs which challenged the state of the art of
their day (the C-5A is listed with a ratio of 2.27) [Ref. 27:p. III-1]. If the ratio of RDT&E
to first unit cost is revised downward to one, the cost estimate for the total six airship run is
reduced to $368 million. 2 This reduction allows for a before taxes profit of just under 11%
on a combined initial and follow on contract. The use of a ratio of one reduces the loss in
the initial contract to $32 million.
2JWN [Ref. 2 7 :p. 6] attached no statistical significance to the ratio of RD&TE to first unit
cost, it is taken as a "rule of thumb". JWN derives the C.E.R. for first unit costs entirely from
airship data. As noted, the RDT&E ratio was derived from a separate data source, thus
rejecting the JWN RDT&E figure does not result in concluding the C.E.R. for first unit cost
is invalid.
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The first unit cost of the JWN C.E.R. by a large margin, is driven by the maximum
velocity of the airship (Speed2"6). When the causal relationship between speed and cost is
considered, an increase in the maximum speed is reflected in a rapid increase in the
aerodynamic load the hull must accomuodate. The maximum bending moment for gust
penetration becoines the driving factor in determining the hull strength for a given velocity.
Accounting for additional speed increases the overall weight of the hull [Ref. 32]. By this
means, the non-linear increase in hull strength required by inc{reasing the airship's maximum
velocity, cost is reflected by speed. However, judged by today's technology the well
designed old airships could not achieve the true maximum velocity of which their airfames
were capable. The "normally aspirated" engines of all previously constructed airships
suffered from a considerable reduction in available horsepower with increasing altitude [Ref.
33]. The modern design considered here, with turbo-charging and gas turbines, suffers
comparatively little power loss at altitudes up to 10,000 feet. A modern airship may use the
gain in "apparent" horsepower to Increase speed in the less dense atmosphere found at 10,000
feet. The net result is a modem airship which achieves a speed of 90 kts. at a 10,000 foot
altitude may have insufficient installed horsepower to make 80 kts. at sea level. Based on
these considerations, it is inappropriate to use maximum velocity without an altitude
correction factor. The proposed airship is then based on a maximum velocity of 82 kts at sea
level (82 kts being the design speed of the ZPG-3 airship). With the "altitude corrected"
maximum velocity of 82 knots at sea level, the JWN C.E.R. estimates the first unit cost of
a 2.3 MCF airship at $58.95 million in FY87$. The airspeed corrected C.E.R. is applied with
two variations. In the first instance program costs are estimated with the RDT&E factor at
two, and in the second, RDT&E costs are reduced to one times the first unit cost. The results
of these calculations are shown in Table 15, along with those from the unmodified JWN
C.E.R. and the case where only the RDT&E costs are reduced.
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TABLE 15
PRODUCTION COSTS FOR A 2.3 M.C.F.AIRSHIP BY C,E.R.S
(in millions of FY87$)
CASE A B C D
First unit 75.16 75.16 58.95 58.95
Hull production 278.60 278.60 218.69 218.69
Propulsion 14.90 14.90 10.90 10,90
Total producLion 293.50 293.50 229.59 229.59
RDT&E 150.32 75.16 117.9 58.95
Total cost 443.82 368.66 347.49 288.54
Initial single airship
contract value 118.20
%Profit (before TAX) -92.86 -29.31 -51.16 -1.29
Full six airship
contract value 412.40
%PROFIT (before TAX) -7.4 10.61 15,74 30,03
Airship cost (per) 73.97 61.44 57.91 48.09
Notes, adjustments to original JWN C.E.R in column: A, no adjustment, the original JWN
C.E.R. used, B, the RDT&E ratio is lowered to one, C, adjusted for maximum airship speed
@ sea level, D, the RDT&E ratio is lowered to one, adjusted for maximum airship speed @
sea level of 82 kts. First unit costs are absorbed in hull production.
The modified C.E.R.s all show a potential for profit over the full six airship contract. In
no case was any potential profit estimated for the initial contract. Only in the case where both
the RDT&E ratio and the airship maximum speed were modified from the original JWN
C.E.R.s was the loss on the initial contract small. For use as a bases for comparison against
alternative systems the estimate from the speed only (C above) modified C.E.R., with a
modest profit of 16%, appears as a conservatively reasonable choice.
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B. MARGINAL COST OF INCREASING AIRSHIP SIZE
When the cost estimating relationship (modified for maximum airspeed at sea level) is
applied across a range of airship displacements from the basic 2.5 mcf to almost twice as large
at 4.6 mcf, costs result as shown in Table 16.
TABLE 16
AIRSHIP COST AS A FUNCTION OF DISPLACEMENT FOR A 21 AIRSHIP BUY
(Costs in Millions of FY87$)
Airship Displacement
(million cubic feet) 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.60
First unit 60.59 64.35 67.71 74.10
Hull production 561.35 596.16 627.27 686.47
Propulsion 55.51 63.05 70.58 87.15
Total production 616.86 659.21 697.85 773.62
RTD&E 121.19 128.70 135.42 148.20
Total cost
including 20% profit 885.66 945.49 999.92 1,106.19
Airship cost (per unit) 42.17 45.02 47.62. 52.68
Note: First unit costs are absorbed in hull production.
C. COMBAT SYSTEM COST
Mission avionics costs are calculated by use of C.E.Rs and learning factors for the AWG-
9 fire control system and learning for the AWG -9 modification and installation costs [Ref.
34:pp. 32-45]. A flat rate of $15 million (FY87$) is estimated for the common suite (the
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base aine S3-B avionics, TPS-63 and NTU components) [Ref. 35].1 Mission avionics and
airship costs are shown in Table 17. Note that the airship cost rises less than 30% as the
displacement is doubled, but as the mission avionics payload is increased to the "brute force"
level for guaranteed performance, overall costs approximately double.
D. PROGRAM ACQUISITION COSTS
To obtain the total acquisition cost the costs of production and research and development
arm added to the costs of Investment for:
a. building or conversion of facilities to support the airship
b. improvements to manufacture's facilities
c. initial training of crew and support personnel
d. initial spares
Costs for items (a) through (c) are estimated based on the 1977 study conducted by
Goodyear Aerospace for a similar system.4 The following cost estimates, corrected for
inflation to millions of FY87$, are made for a 21 airship V.eet.
3The cost of the basic avionics suite is based on estimates from a 1983 Rand study [Ref.
35]. The 1983 study looked at the case for a new development 5000 pound avionics suite
using CERs developed in the previously cited [Ref. 34:pp. 32-45] Rand avionics paper. The
case for the airship basic combat system avionics is similar. The study concluded that the
unit cost of the system would be about $20 million (FY87$). The research and development
costs and production costs were approximately equal. Because the airship system is
constructed from existing in production hardware, RDT&E costs should be lower. A factor
of 0.75, to discount RDT&E, was applied to the Rand figure to estimate the basic airship suite
at $15 million in FY87$.
4The Goodyear study looked at costs for two airship sizes, 1.5 mcf and 11.5 mcf
respectively [Ref. 36 :p. 21]. This study used a linear interpolation between the two given
sizes for a 3.0 mcf airship.
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TABLE 17
MISSION AVIONICS AND TOTAL SYSTEM COSTS
Airship Displacement
(million cubic feet) 2.50 3.0 3.50 4.60
Fire Control production
factors. (costs in MS)
AWG-9 units to date 640 640 640 640
AWG-9 first unit cost 17.82 17.82 17.82 17.82
Cost of initial AWG-9
unit for airship 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51
Illuminators/airship 2 6 12 12
New units installed 42 126 252 252
Install/modification cost
per AWG-9 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
Mission Avionics,
21 sets GFE in FY87M$
Production 109.41 323.30 633.43 633.43
Installation 11.51 26.20 44.01 44.01
Total AWG-9 120.92 349.50 677.45 677.45
Base Line Suite 315.00 315.00 315.00 315.00
Total avionics 435.92 664.50 992.45 992.45
Mission avionics per airship 20.76 31.64 47.26 47.26
Total cost for 1
ready airship 62.93 76.67 94.87 99.93
Total R&D and Production
for a 21 Airship Buy 1,321.58 1,609.99 1,992.37 2,098.63
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a. $60 FY87M$ for facilities to support the airship at NAS Lakehurst and NAS Moffet,
including airship peculiar equipment (helium storage and handling, ground support
equipment, etc. ) [Ref. 36:p. 16]
b. $30 FY87M$ for improvements to manufacture's facilities [Ref. 36:p. 15]
c. $20 FY87M$ for initial training of crew and support personnel [Ref. 36:p. 20]
Initial spares are estimated as 10% of production costs as $160 FY87M$. The total
additional investment in the 21 airship system is then $270 FY87M$ bringing the total
Program Acquisition Cost to:
a. $1591 FY87M$ for 2.5 (mcf) airships or 76 (M$) per airship
b. $1879 FY87M$ for 3.0 (mcf) airships or 90 (M$) per airship
c. $2262 FY87M$ for 3.5 (mcf) airships or 108 (M$) per airship
1. Airship Life Cycle Costs
The life cycle cost of the system is obtained by adding the operating and support costs
to those of program acquisition. Annual operating and support costs were estimated from the
Goodyear study as $6 FY87M$ [Ref. 36:p. 36]. Based on these figures, the life cycle cost
of an airship system with 21 airships over 30 years would be approximately:
a. $5371 FY87M$ for 2.5 (mcf) airships
'I. $5659 FY87M$ for 3.0 (mci) airships
c. $6042 FY87M$ for 3.5 (mc) airships
E. COST COMPARISON: AIRSHIPS VS. FIXED/ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT
As an alternative to the proposed airship program, a combination of fixed-wing and
rotary-wing aircraft are considered in the same mission. The comparison will be based on
providing 6 airborne fire control systems to the SAG. The fixed-wing aircraft will fill the
surveillance and early warning role of the airship, while the rotary-wing aircraft will perform
the fire control mission. The candidates for the surveillance platform are the land based E-
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3A AWACS aircraft and the P-3 AWACS currently under development. The helicopters are
modified from the current fleet ASW helicopter, the SH-60B (Lamps III).
Unit costs for these platforms, in millions of FY87$, are taken as:'
a. E-3A AWACS $110
b. P-3 AWACS $60
c. SH-60 $13
Keeping an aircraft continuously on station consumes a great deal of resources. As a rule
of thumb, a minimum requirement would be to have 3 fixed-wing aircraft or 4 helicopters
available to maintain such a continuous station. In the case here, the fixed-wing aircraft
would be shuttling from their land base to the position of the suiface action group.
Considering the warning time available from the higher flying (compared to the proposed
airship) fixed-wing aircraft, to be approximately 20 minutes, it could be feasible to keep the
helicopters on deck on the escort vessels in a 5 minute standby status. Such a condition would
provide for the least number of helicopters. For this comparison 8 helicopters is taken as an
absolute minimum to maintain 6 helicopters in standby status.
Based on the above, and if modifying the fixed wing aircraft and helicopters could be
accomplished for 3 MS each, the cost, in FY87M$, of providing a 6 illuminator force to the
SAG would be:
SThe aircraft unit costs are from, for the E-3A, U.S. Air Force Planning Factors [Ref.
37:p, 124], for the SH-60B, Military Cost Data Handbook [Ref. 38:p. 124] and for the P-3
AEW the Asian Defense Journal, [Ref. 39 :p. 23]. To cover the cost of current upgrades to
the E-3A radar, $10 FY87M$ is added to the quoted unit cost. The cost of the modifications
and additions, required to give the fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters the capability of the
airborne fire control system proposed for the airship, is estimated as the cost of the fire
control system (installed) of the 6 illuminator airship (page 92) divided by the number of
fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters used. This estimate neglects the additional costs of the
duplication of hardware and increased system complexity introduced when utilizing eleven
aircraft vice one airship.
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Airship System: E-3A system: P-3 system:
I airship@ $90 3 E-3As @ $110 3 P-3s @ $60
8 SH-60s@ $13 8SH-60s@ $13
F/C system @ $33 F/C system @ $33
Total $90 $467 $317
The acquisition cost of providing the 6 illuminator force to the SAG is on the order of
3.5 to 5 times lower using the airship. When allowing for a 100% underestimation of airship
acquisition costs, the airship still provides the capability at one half of the cost of the
alternatives considered.
1. Life Cycle Cost Comparison
The above estimates were made under the most favorable conditions to the land based
surveillance aircraft. Figure 24 illustrates the relationship between the time a given aircraft
can remain on station verses the distance of that station from the aircraft's base [Ref. 39 :p.
23]. Once the SAG moves far enough away from the aircraft's base that a pipeline situation
develops (multiple aircraft must be airborne in order to keep one station continuously filled),
the cost of providing land based support rapidly escalates. Consider E-3As and P-3 AWACS
operating 1500 nrn from home base. Assuming block transit speeds of 500 and 400 knots
respectively, the E-3A will average 2 aircraft airborne continuously and the P-3 will average
3. This implies, by rule of thumb, a 6 E-3A or a 9 P-3 aircraft force to support the SAG.
When the SAG is 2000 nrm from the aircraft's operating base (roughly the distance from
Diego Garcia to the Straits of Hormuz), the P-3 would require 8 aircraft while tne E-3A
would require 6 aircraft. When the SAG exceeds from between 2200 to 2400 nautical miles
from the aircraft base, support is no longer possible. The actual geographic distance from
the SAG to the aircraft base is a poor indicator of the actual distance the aircraft may be
required to transit. As demonstrated in the combined U.S. Air Force and Navy raid on Libya,
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the distance land based aircraft fly to reach a particular destination is controlled by politics
as well as geography.
When operating and support costs are considered the case for the proposed airship system
becomes even stronger. Based on U.S. Air Force cost fac'tcr [Ref. 37], the annual cost of
fielding one E-3A AWACS aircraft, in FY87$, is $t. .%2 million, This figure is based on
operating the AWACS for an average cf 125 hours a month. if the minimum 3 aircraft could
support the 2 to 3 times greater flight hours required of the continuous (720 hours a month)
station, the minimum cost would be greater than $33 million. The average cost of supporting
one helicopter, taken from the same source, is $4.2 million (FY87$). The combined annual
operating and support cost of the mixed fixed-wing and helicopter SAG support group would
exceed $67 million FY87$. Over a 30 year life-cycle, if the airship annual operating cost is
doubled to $12 million (FY87$), the comparative total costs of providing 6 illuminators to
-t SAG (in FY87M$) would be:
Airship based system: $450
E-3A/SH-60 based system: $2,477
It is not unreasonable to conclude that a SAG supported by 3 airships would be less costly
than using a combination of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. In the convoy escort role, a first generation airship has the potential, at the level of
capability examined, to maintain the combat effectiveness and thus extend the service life of
current AAW platforms while concurrently reducing the number of hulls rMquired by one
haiLf
2. The threat to be opposed, in the employment of surface forces with and without
tactical air support fora given level of threat resources, is fundamentally different Ind ,rater
for the surface force without tactical aircover.
3. Given the capability of surface ships for mutual support, overthe range of parameters
examined high altitude high speed ASCMs are not a significant threat when seen in numbers
less than the total force magazine capacity. The grng al tLhrmaLfaced by unsupported
surface forces is the potential for the opposition to exploit the surface ships' limited horizon,
by use of low flying anti-ship cruise missiles. Long range, low flying ASCMs are relatively
ineffective in isolating and concentrating force on individual units of the surface force (as
opposed to discriminating against CV sized targets).
4. Of the low flying threats examined, the most stressful was posed by tactical aircraft
(fighter/attack). Even with improved shipboard systems capable of reducing reaction time
against ASCMs to as little 2 seconds and with SAMs with a Mach 3 average velocity at 3 nm
from launch, a surface group is disadvantaged vis-a-vis tactical aircraft with Mach 2 +. low
flying ASMs.
5. Over the range of threat and defensive parameters investigated, the potential for
using surface ship forces in the "Revolution at Sea" concept will be limited when operating
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independent of either land or carrier based tactical aircover or an airship and ill furtle
declint.with logical near term improvements in sea skimming cruise missiles and tactical
aircraft targeting.
6. Because of the potential long distance from land bases, fixed wing aircraft are inferior
to airships for continuous support of a SAG.
7. Because of the large number of rotary wing aircraft required, the airship is preferable
on nearly every basis for a fire control platform.
8. With development of the airship, (or the large variety and number of fixed and rotary
wing assets required to substitute for the airships capability), the following conclusions may
be drawn:
a. A four illuminator airship operating at or above 10,000 feet can be expected to reduce
by 100% the number of low flying ASCMs, launched from tactical aircraft, penetrating
to the inner defensive zone of a surface battle group merely by utilizing "off the shelf'
technology. This conclusion is based on raid sizes up to 60 cruise missiles.
b.The base line airship performance level was established with the assumptions of;
i. an airship at an altitude of 10,000 feet
ii. an ECM clear environment(in terms of range of detection)
iii. dual SAM salvos utilizing a SAM with a kinetic range limit of on the order of 100
nautical miles
In terms of sensitivity, this performance level is maintainable as the operating altitude is
reduced to 2,000 ft, and/or, the range of detection, the range to ECM burn. thru or the
maximum range of the SAM, are reduced to on the order of 60 nm, if the number of airship
illuminators is increased from 4 to 12 and single SAM salvos are used.
c. Beyond the "near term" threat, the most demanding response will be to a threat with
simultaneous:
i. ASCM radar cross section reduction
ii. cruise altitude decrease
iii. terminal velocities increase
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Response to such a threat is likely be the expensive both as to the electronics and the
surface-to-air missiles required to cope, regardless of the platform employed. When
considering the growth potential of the airship concept vis-a-vis the growth in threat
capabilities, the airship airframe appears to be able to evolve at a rate commensurate with the
threat. This is in terms of the economics of increasing airship displacement to support a
payload capable of generating the RF power and or the aperture required agadnst future
threats,
d. Establishing the absolute level of survivability and vulnerability of the airship was
not a primary issue of this study, However, cursory analysis demonstrates that the airship
will be more survivable than any ship in a convoy or a battle group.
9. The first generation airship has the potential to make the AAW problem manageable
for existing surface ships unaccompanied by land or sea based conventional airpower, With
the airship capability added, the goals of the "Revolution at Sea" are attainable,
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Based on the above conclusions, it would appear the cancellation of the Navy's
Lightei-Than-Air research and development program was short sighted. The airship
program should be reconstituted frorn the current DARPA R&D effort andfund.Ud at a Il
togainbthe extent possible he original 1992 IOC.
2. To establish and maintain priorities, it is recommended the Navy's lighter-than-air
program be Vonsored. funded and controlled by the user community, Surface Warfare,
3. Development of the first generation airship should concentrate on "feasible" vice
"optimal". With this in mind, It is recommended that as the best hedge against uncertainty,
the nirship purchased displace no less than 3.0 million cubic feet. A major purpose of early
deployment is to gain tactical experience, Another purpose is to reduce uncertainty in airship
production and operating costs.
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4. Concurrent with the first generation airship development, research should begin to
fill the requirements for a follow on, Aegis compatible, second generation airship.
5. Development should proceed with a "quick reaction" box launcher (SAM)
for use on the first generation airship, based on NATO Sea Sparrow and CIWS
technology. Such a development would offer a satisfactory solution to the
"worst case" AAW threat to convoys and URGs from "in close" submarine launched
ASCMs.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
1, Investigate the feasibility and utility of the installation of airship-compatible SAMs
in the ASW escorts scheduled to receive vertical launch modifications (DD-963s)
2. Explore the feasibility and impact of developing a long range (first CZ +) vertical
launch "ASROC" to utilize the immediate, highly accurate, well classified datum the airship
can provide against a OTH ASCM firing submarine.
3, Investigate using a heavy payload, low altitude variant of the basic first generation
airship, adapted to the battle group ASW mission. In view of the quieting trends in
submarines, the impact of such a platform employing large, high power, active sensors, such
as multifrequency towed/dipped sonars and utilizing a heavy torpedo, with a high single shot
probability of kill could be significant.
4. Investigate the tactical employnment options provided by airships with regard to
positioning of forces and scouting. The use of sophisticated high speed UAVs, launched and
recovered from airships, controlled from surface ships may provide the battle group covert,
real time, targeting quality data, at extended ranges.
5. Conduct additional study into the use of airships in a CV battle group environment,
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APPENDIX A
FIRE CONTROL ALGORITHM AND SPREADSHEET IMPLEMENTATION
Based on the inputs for the altitude of the radar (airship or surface escort) and the
incoming target, the spreadsheet determines the range at which the target will become
engagable with the given SAM average velocity (point of earliest intercept). The program
utilizes an algorithm which considers all of the additional factors which might delay launch
of a SAM to make the earliest possible intercept. These factors are, the status of launchers
(reload time), illuminator availability and the number of SAMs currently airborne. If any or
all of these factors prevent making the earliest possible intercept, the algorithm determines
when the longest lasting of the limiting conditions will be cleared. The time the last condition
clears then becomes the time of launch. Based on the time of SAM launch, the time and
position of the target's interception are recorded. The fire control algorithm, in its most
generic form, is detailed below.
A. FIRE CONTROL ALGORITHM
Indexs:
target number = n, n = 1 to 60
dummy = j, j = all values < current i
launcher = 1, as desired
illuminator i, "" "
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Parameters:
RH, input value for search radar height
TH, input value for target height
TS, input value for time interval between targets
DT, input value for the fire control systems time to detect, establish a track
and launch a missile against a target
ITR, input value for length of terminal engagement phase
SAMV, input value for SAM average velocity
ASCMV, input value for target velocity
SAMSALVO, number of SAMs launched in each salvo
MAXSAM, maximum number of SAMs in flight
NUMSAM, time indexed running total of the number of SAMs launched
NUMINT, time indexed running total of the number of completed interception
attempts
LOAD, SAM launcher reload time
RXH, range at which targets cross the radar horizon
OFT(n), open fire time on the "n"th target, the time at which a SAM launch is
possible
ROFT(n), range of target at OFT(n)
LRT(n), time the SAM launcher will be available for the "n"th target
LT(l,n) launch time of salvo for target "n" from launcher "I"
LT(l,n- 1), launch time of last salvo from "l"th launcher
IFT(i,n- 1), time "i"th illuminator is available, earliest time "n"th target can enter
terminal engagement phase
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EPLT(n), earliest possible launch time on "n" target
EPIT(n), earliest possible intercept time for "n"th target
TOF(n), time of flight from SAM launch to target n's interception
SIT(n), scheduled interception time for target n
RANGE(n), range to target n at intercept
STEP 1: (Initial target)
a. based on RI-I and TH determine RXH for run.
b. given RXH, DT and ASCMV determine ROFT(1) and set OFT(l) =0
c. determine all interception parameters for n = 1
d. increment NUMSAM by SAMSALVO
STEP 2: (calculate time next target reaches open fire range)
a. n = n + 1 ( if n is larger than the input size of the raid, stop)
b. OFT(n) = OFT(n- 1) + TS
STEP 3: (calculate time next SAM salvo will be available)
a. LRT(n) = MIN[ LT(I,n-1) + LOAD] for all 1 launchers
STEP 4: (calculate time the next illuminator will be available)
a. EPIT(n) = MIN [ IFT(i,n-1) I ) + ITR
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STEP 5: (given that an intercept would take place at EP1T(n), calculate the time at
which the SALVO must have been launched, i.e. solve the equations of motion for SAM
flight time given SAMV, ASCMV and the time of intercept (EPIT(n))
a. EPLT(n) = [EPIT(n) - TOF(n) ]
STEP 6: (determine the most limiting condition for firing on target)
a. LT(n) =MAX ( OFT(n), LRT(n), EPLT(n) )
STEP 7: (determine if the maximum number of SAMs allowed in flight will be
violated by a launch at time LT(n))
a. IF ( NUMSAM - NUMINT > MAXSAM ) at LT(n) continue, o/w go to STEP
8
b. LT(n) =( MIN[ 1T(n-j) for all j ], such that, IT(n-j)>LT(n)) (find the next
scheduled interception after time LT(n))
STEP 8: (Using current LT(n), calculate and record all intercept parameters)
a. record TOF, RANGE schedule SIT(n)
b. increment NUMSAM by SAMSALVO
c. return to STEP 2
B. SPREADSHEET IMPLEMENTATION
In many respects the spreadsheet application greatly simplifies the fire control algorithm,
albeit, at the loss of some generality. All of the indexing becomes an implict or explict
function of postion on the spreadsheet. In typical fashion, a spreadsheet is divided by rows
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and columns into"cells"', The postion of a cell is defined by the column designation (usually
a letter) and the number of the row in which it resides. As an example, Figure 25 shows a




ROW A B D 
1 INPUT DATA
2 SAM SPEED, (NM/MIN) 30
3 TARGET SPEED < 10 NUMBER OF
4 LAUNCHER CYCLE (SEC) 15 ATTACKING AIRCRAFT
5 ILLUMINATION (SEC) 30 ASCM LAUNCH
6 TARGET SPACING (SEC) 2 RANGE (NM)
7
8 SAM'S PER SALVO 2
9 MAX SAM'S AIRBORNE 24
10 SEARCH RADAR HEIGHT 10000 NUMBER OF ASCMs
11 TARGET HEIGHT (F) 25
12 HORIZION RANGE (NM) 130.67 note; AIRSHIP (4 ILLUM)
13 DETECTION DELAY (SEC) 30




18 EARLYEST OPEN FIRE TIME:
19 TARGET#1 0 .00 .00
20 TARGET#2 1 1.00 .00
22 TARGET#4 3 16.00 .00
23 TARGET#5 4 4.00 19.88
24 TARGET#6 5 5.00 20.88
Figure 25, Partial Spreadsheet Output showing Cell Designations
'The procedures used here are based on the Framework IIl• spreadsheet [Ref. 40].
However, spreadsheet conventions have become standardized in the implementation of most
of the "full function" microcomputer based applications. The major differences are in the
language used to define, and the allowed complexity of, cell formulas.
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Information entered into a cell may take one of three forms, either character data (labels),
numeric (constants), or formulas (short programs). In Figure 25, entries in column "A", A 1
thru A14, are parameter names. Entries in column "B", B2 thru B 14, are the values of the
input parameters representing particular scenario assumptions. In terms of the fire control
algorithm the cells in column "B" represent:
B2 = SAMV, SAM velocity in nautical miles per minute
B3 = ASCMV, target velocity in nautical miles per minute
B4 - LOAD, launchercycle time in seconds (also used as the system effective inter-salvo
time)
B5 = ITR, terminal illumination in seconds
B6 = TS, target spacing in seconds
B7, Blank
B8 = SAMSALVO, number of SAMs in a single salvo
B9 = MAXSAM, maximum number of SAMs which can be supported
B10 = RH, search radar height in feet
B 11 = TH, target height in feet
B12 = RXH, range at which target crosses the search radar's horizon in nautical miles
B 13 = DT, minimum time delay between target crossing horizon and SAM launch,in
seconds
B14 = ROFT(1), range of target when it reachs the open fire position,in nautical miles
Rows 15 to 18 are blank. Starting with row 19, each row in the spreadsheet represent the
action taken against a single target, in the order in which the targets cross the search radar
horizon. Taking row 24 (6th target) as represenative, the cell entries axe examined.
Cell A24 contains the label designating the row as containing data concerning the sixth
target to reach open fire range.
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Cell B24 contains the formula for calculating the time the 6th target reaches open fire
range. The formula in B24 is expressed (in Framework II's syntax) as;
"B23 + $B$6"2.
This means take the value found in cell B23, which is the time the 5th target reached open
fire range, OFT(5), and add to it the value found in cell B6 ( interval between targets, TS)
and to display and use the value calculated as OFT(6).
Cell C24 contains the formula for determing when a SAM launcher will be available to
support the engagement of the 6th target, LRT(6), and is expressed as;
"E22 + $B$4".
This means take the value found in cell E22 (the time of launch against target 4, LT(4), and
add to it the effective launcher cycle time found in cell B4 (LOAD). Note that the above
formula implies a two launcher system as the reference to the last launcher used refers to a
position two rows above row 24. This follows from the assumption launchers are used
sequencially. The number of launchers available in a given spreadsheet scenario depends on
the offset between the current row number and the row referenced for the last time a launcher
was used. In this case, if the formula in cell C24 had reffered to cell E23, a one launcher
system would be implied, and if E20 had been referrenced a four launcher system would have
been implied.
Cell D24 contains the formula determining when an illuminator will be available to start
terminal tracking/illumination against the sixth target (IFT). The formula is "G20" which
is a reference to the cell which contains the time illumination will cease on the second target.
2When a formula in a given cell is copied to another cell location, all cell addresses in the
formula are modified to reflect the offset relative to the original location. In some instance!,
it is desireable to prevent the normal relative address shift on some elements of a copied
formula. The "$" symbol in front of the comurmn or row in the cell name is used to "freeze"
or prevent relative address shifts when the formula is copied to a new location.[Ref. 41: p.
142]
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As with launchers, the number of illuminators is reflected in the difference between the
current row and the row referenced. In this case, four illuminators are indicated.
Cell E24 contains the "subroutine" which determines the actual time of a SAM salvo
against the sixth target, LT(6). The subroutine has three main functions;
a. determine the earlest possible time a SAM salvo could be launched against the sixth
target given the launcher/illuminator status and the time the target crosses the firing
horizon.
b. determine the number of SAM intercepts scheduled to occur by the most restrictive of
either the illuminator or launcher constraints and the time of the next intercept scheduled
after the clearing time of the controlling constraint.
c, determine the earlest launch time that will not violate the maximun allowable number
of SAMs in flight and output the result as the salvo launch time.
A flow chart of "Launch Time Decision" is shown in Figure 26. The formula for cell
E24 is in the program listing.
The spreadsheet uses nine additional columns (E to M) not shown in Figure 25. These
additional columns are blank in Rows I to 18. From Row 19 down, columns F to M contain
active cells which continue the single target calculations of columns B to E,
Cell F24 determines the time of flight (TOF(6)) from SAM launch to target intercept with
the expression;
"((($B$14 - (($E24-$B24)/60)*$B$3))/($B$2+$B$3))*60".
This expression, in terms of the fire control algorithm, is;
"([OFR - [ ((LT(6)-OFT(6))/60) ASCMV] ] / (SAMV+ASCMV)) 60".
Cell G24 displays the scheduled "clock" time of the SAM salvo intercept with the
expression;
"@PUT($M24,($E24 +$F24)),@ RESULT(($E24+$F24))".
In terms of the fire control algorithm, this is;
"LT(6) + TOF(6)".
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Cell Formula "E" (Row 24 shown)
INMTALIZE VARIABLES (from current spreadsheet position)
n . 24 (current row)
Cr M 64C2490 (launcher ready time)
LT - 0 (earlycst posible launch time [EPLTQ1)])
TOTAL = 0 (zero interception counter)
N1.MSAM - "J(n-IY' (number of SAMs launched, from cell J23)
MIAXSAM - "B9" (system limit on SAMs airborne)
LNUM - 5000 (arbitrarily large value)
IT - 0 (dummy variable for intercept time sort)
LU W "4012"9 (last time a SAMs aloft hold was cleared)
READ "M(k)",km19,n-1I (read in all previous intercept times)
Fiue 6 Fochr o auc Tm Dcsin
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The expressions, "@PUT" and "@RESULT", are Framework II functions used to
direct the result of the above calculation to the M24 cell location as well as the parent cell
[Ref. 4 l:p. 501].
Cell H-I24 calculates the range of the target from the firing escort at the moment of SAM
launch (LRANGE(6)) with the expression;
"$B$14 - ($E24 - $B24)* $B$3/60".
Cell 124 calculates the range of the target from the firing escort at the moment SAM
intercept (RANGE(6)) with the expression;
"$I-2ý .. '.,F724/60) * ($B$3))",
Cell J24 is the sum of SAMs launched, NUMSAM, with the expression;
"J23+$B$8".
Cell K24 is the sum of the SAMs remaining in flight with the expression;
"J24 - L24".
In terms of the fire control algorithm this :1,,
"NUMSAM - NUMINT"'.
One additional column in the spreadsheet is used to perform initialization/housekeeping
functions. Cells in column "0" are used here, but any group of blank cells may be utilized
so long as they are above the target calculation rows, i.e. above row 19. The spreadsheet
initialization formulas are shown at the top of the program listing (Appendix A, page xyz).
1. Spreadsheet Construction
By the methods indicated for the software package chosen, create a blank spreadsheet.
Set the sheet's "Reclac" function to "row-wise". Starting with the blank spreadsheet, copy
the labels and input parameter values from columns A and B into the same locations in the
new rows 2 to 14. Copy the formulas from the listing for cells B 12 and B 14 into the same
cells in the new spreadsheet. In column 0, copy the initialization formulas into rows 2 to 11.
Copy the formulas or thier equivalent, as shown for row 24 in the listing, into row 24 of the
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new spreadsheet. Highlight the 24th row and select the spreadsheets "copy" function. Copy
row 24 into the next 24 rows below and then into the 5 rows above. This gives the spreadsheet
positions for 30 targets. If more targets are required, simply continue. the copy process down
the appropriate number of rows. The spreadsheet copying process automaticly changes
formula row references based on the relative shift from the original row location. As Row
19 concerns data on the initial target, several cell locations in Row 19 will be in error. Erase
the formulas in cells B 19 and E 19 and insert zeros. By definition, the time at which the first
target reaches open fire range and the first S AM salvo is launched is scenario time zero. Erase
the formulas in cells J19 and K19 and insert the expression "B8" (SAMs per Salvo).
Next, set the number of launcher and illuminators desired in the scenario, For
illuminators, move to cell D19 (the illuminator free time for the first target) and access the
spreadsheet's "Edit" function. Delete the formula residing in D 19, replace it with a zero and
exit the edit function. Now copy the new formula in D19 (a zero) down the "D" column to
the depth such that zeros will appear in the same number of rows as illuminators are desired,
Still in column "D", move to the first cell below the zero entries and enter the edit function.
Enter the formula "G 19" into the cell and exit the edit function. Highlight the newly edited
cell and copy it to all cells below in column "D". The number of launchers in the scenario
is handled in the same manner. The principle being to "hardwire" zeros in column "C" from
row 19 to the row depth representing the desired number of launchers. Now, remaining in
column "C", modify the formula in the next cell below to reference back to the launch time
against the first target (E19). Copy the modified formula to all cells below the current
position in column "C". The spreadsheet is now ready for use,
The expression "effective SAM inter-salvo time" has been used here for the fire
control algorithm parameter"LOAD" which represents the actual timerequired to reload one
launcher. The reason for this distinction is to take advantage of the spreadsheet's flexibility
in portarying a system. As configured, the spreadsheet represents a surface escort with two
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launchers, each launcher having two rails. Such an escort, with a 30 second launcher reload
time, would be capable of firing a two SAM salvo every 15 seconds. It would be possible
to model the same escort "system" in the spreadsheet by allowing for only one launcher if
"LOAD" (cell B4) were set to 15 seconds. Conversely, two such twin launcher, dual rail
escorts are modeled by establishing two launchers with an equivalent reload time of 15
seconds. To generate the large number of scenarios required in this study, the method, of
leaving the number of launchers at two and varing the launcher reload time to meet the system
equivalent, was found to save a great deal of time, as well as reducing the number of errors
introduced by constantly editing the spreadsheet formulas. The method does have the
disadvantage of making the scenario configeration, being modeled, unclear without close
scuitiny of, or additional notation added to, the output.
2. Modeling Vertical Launcher Systems
A realistic model of multi-cell vertical launch escort can be made by setting up the
spreadsheet to reflect one single rail launcher with a very short reload time. In the vertical
launch case, the value contained in cell B4 does not represent launcher cycle time (or the fca
value LOAD) but a time delay that the fire control system modeled must allow between SAM
launches. To modify the spreadsheet as given, to a VLS configeration, enter "E19 + $B$4"
as the formula for cell C20. Copy C20 to all cells in column "C" below row 20. Change the
parameter (SAMs per SALVO) in cell B8 to one. If the further simplifing assumption is
made that the fire control system modeled has no time delay between SAM launches (B4 is
set to zero), then launcher considerations drop out as a controlling factor in the fire control
algorithm. The assumption of no fire control delay between SAM launches was made in all
scenario's involving "state of the art" escorts. To reflect no time delay restrictions between
launches in the spreadsheet, enter "B2" as the formula for cell C19. Copy C19 to all cells,
row 20 and below, in column "C". The result is a SAM will be available for a target at the
time the target crosses the escort's horizon.
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C. PROGRAM LISTING
The following is a partial listing (all columns, rows down to 24) of the code FRAME-
WORK uses to create the fire control spreadsheet. The format of the listing is:
"cell address (column/row):
formula in cell"
Initialization formulas in column C lead off the listing followed by a row-wise listing of
formulas for rows 2 to 24. Character fields (labels) are ignored in the listing. Numerical























@PUT($MI ,($EI9 +$F1Q)),@RESULT(($E19+$FI 9))H 19:
$8$14 - (SEIQ- $B19)" $83/60
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$B$14 - (IIE20 - $820)' $8*3/60
120:

























TOTAL:. TOTAL + 8,
LNUM:- IT
TOTAL:. TOTAL + S8$9
ONEXT($0$lg:$020),
*IF( (.J20 - TOTAL) >- $B$9,
*IF( OT -cLN U M,







QPUT($M21 ,($E21 +$F21 )),@RESULT(($E21+$F21))
H21:








































SB$14 - ($E22 - $B22)' $BS3'6
122:



























TOTAL:- TOTAL + $$8.
LNUM:. IT
TOTAL:. TOTAL + $6$88
ONEXT($G$19:$G22),
Q@IF( (J22 - TOTAL) >. $B$9,
@PIF( CT < NUM,








$6514 - ($E 23 - $B23)' $8$3/60
123:






























TOTAL:- TOTAL + $B$8
ON EXT($G$1g:$G23),










$B$14 -($1224 $824)- $B$3/60
124:








D. Scenario Spreadsheet Output
The spreadsheet mny be recreated by copying the listing as given into a blank spreadsheet,
but the method (of copying and modifying row 24) described in the implementation section
is likely to produce better results.
INPUT DATA
SAM SPEED, (NM/MIN) 30
TARGET SPEED 25
LAUNCHER CYCLE TIME .00 ATTACKING AIRCRAFT 30
ILLUMINATiON (SEC.) 30
TARGET SPACING (SEC.) 1 AACM LAUNCH RANGE 200
S".'.'S PER SALVO I AACM SPEED 25
MAX SAM'S AIRBORNE 24
SEARCH RADAR HEIGHT 75 NUMBER OF ASCa's 20
TARGET HEIGHT (FT.) 25000
HORIZION RANGE (NM) 207.S5 note: STATE OF THE ART A)AW ESCORT, VERTICAL LAUNCH, PHASED ARRAY
DETECTION DELAY (SEC) 40
OPEN FIRE RANGE 190.99 DEFENDING AIRSHIP AT 10,000 FT. AIRSHIP IS WITHIN 25 NM.
LAUNCHER ILLUMINATOR LAUNCH TIME OF TIME OF RANGE ( RANGE 6
READY FREE TIME FLIGHT INTERCEPT LAUNCH INTERCEPT
TIME TARGET AT OPEN FIRE RANGE:
TARGET 1 0 .00 .00 .00 208.24 200.24 190.89 104.12
TARGET 12 1 .00 ý00 .00 208.69 208.69 191,30 104.35
TARGET f3 2 .00 .00 .00 209.15 209.15 191,72 104.51
TARGET 9 4 3 .00 .00 .00 209.60 209.60 192.14 104.80
TARGET 9 5 4 .00 2C8.24 51.67 186.57 238.24 171.02 93.29
TARGET 1 6 5 .00 208.69 51.67 187.03 238.69 171,44 93.51
TARGET 9 7 6 .00 209.15 51,67 187.49 239.15 171,86 93,74
TARGET 1 8 7 .00 209.60 51.67 187.94 239.60 172.27 93.97
TARGET 1 9 8 .00 238.24 103.33 164.90 268.24 151,16 82.45
TARGET I 10 9 .00 238.69 103.33 165.36 268.69 151.58 82.68
TARGET f11 10 .00 239,15 103.33 165.81 269,15 152.00 82.91
TARGET 912 11 .00 239,60 103.33 166.27 269.60 152.41 83.13
TARGET 913 12 .00 268.24 155.00 143.24 298,24 131.30 71.62
TARGET 9 14 13 .00 268.69 155.00 143.69 298.69 131.72 71.85
TARGET 1 15 14 .00 269.15 155.00 144.15 299.15 132.14 72.07
TARGET 1 16 15 .00 269.60 155.00 144.60 299.60 132.55 72.30
TARGET 1 17 16 .00 298.24 206.67 121.57 328.24 111.44 60.79
TARGE" 918 17 .00 298.69 206.67 122.03 328.69 111.86 61.01
TARGET 1 19 18 .00 299.15 206.67 122.48 329.15 112.27 61.24
TARGET 9 20 19 .00 299.60 206.67 122.94 329.60 112.69 61.47
TARGET 1 21 1 .00 528.24 274.17 84.07 358.24 77.07 42.04
TARGET 1 22 100 328.69 274.17 84.53 358.69 77.48 42.26
TARGET 9 23 3 ,00 329.15 274.17 84.98 359.15 77.90 42.49
TARGET 9 24 4 .00 329.60 274.17 85.44 359.60 78.32 42.72
TARGET # 25 5 .00 358.24 325.83 62.40 388.24 57.20 31.20
TARGET I 26 6 .00 358.69 325.83 62.86 388.69 5'1.62 31.43
TARGET 1 27 7 .00 359.15 325.83 63.31 389.15 58.04 31.66
TARGET 928 8 .00 359.60 325.83 63.77 389.50 58.45 31.88
TARGET 1 29 9 .00 388.24 377.50 40.74 418.24 37.34 20.37
TARGET 1 30 10 .00 388.69 37?.50 41.19 418.69 37.76 20.6U
TARGET # 31 11 .00 389.15 377.50 41.65 419.15 38.18 20.82
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INPUT DATA
SAM SPEED, (NM/MIN) 25
TARGET SPEED 10
LAUNCHER CYCLE TIME .00 ATTACKING AIRCRAFT 30
ILLUMINATION (SEC.) 8
TARGET SPACING (SEC.) i ASCM LAUNCH RANGE 30
SAM'S PER SALVO I ASCM SPEED 20
MAX SAM'S AIRBORNE 24
SEARCH RADAR HEIGHT 75 NUMBER OF ASCM'a 60
TARGET HEIGHT (FT.) 6
HORIZION RANGE (NM) 13.83 note: STATE OF THE ART AAW ESCORT, VERTICAL LAUNCH, PHASED ARRAY
DETECTION DELAY (SEC) 15
OPEN FIRE RANGE 11.33
LAUNCHER ILLUMINATOR LAUNCH TIME OF TIME OF RANGE 8 RANGE 0
READY FREE TIME FLIGHT INTERCEPT LAUNCH INTERCEPTTIME TARGET AT OPEN FIRE RANGE:
TARGET 41 0 .00 .00 .00 19.42 19.42 11.33 8,09
TARGET 12 1 100 .00 .00 19.70 19.70 11.49 8.21
TARGET #3 2 .00 .00 .00 19.99 19.99 11.66 8.33
TARGET #4 3 .00 .00 100 20.27 20.27 11.83 8,45
TARGET #5 4 .00 19.42 9.60 17.82 27.42 10.39 7.42
TARGET 16 5 .00 19.70 9.6C 18.10 27.70 10.56 7.54
TARGET 1 7 6 .00 19.99 9,60 18.39 27,99 10.73 7.66
TARGET 18 7 00 20.27 9.60 18.67 28.27 10.89 7.78
TARGET 1 9 8 .00 27.42 10.20 16.22 35.42 9.46 6,76
TARGET 110 9 .00 27.70 19,20 16.50 35,70 9.63 6.88
TARGET 111 10 .00 27,99 19.20 16.79 35.99 9.79 6.99
TARGET 112 11 .00 28.27 19.20 17.07 36.27 9.96 7,11
TARGET 113 12 .00 35.42 28.80 14.62 43,42 8,53 6.09
TARGET #14 13 .00 35.70 28,80 14.90 43.70 8.69 6.21
TARGET #15 14 .00 35.99 28.80 15.19 43.99 8.86 6,33
TARGET #16 15 100 36.27 28.80 15.47 44,27 9.03 6,45
TARGET #17 16 .00 43.42 38,40 13.02 51.42 7.59 5.42
TARGET #18 17 .00 43.70 38,40 13.30 51.70 7.76 5,54
TARGET 1 19 18 .00 43.99 38,40 13,59 51,99 7.93 5.66
TARGET 120 19 .00 44.27 38,40 13.87 52.27 8.09 5.78
TARGET 121 20 .00 51.42 48,00 11.42 59.42 6.66 4,76
TARGET 1 22 21 .00 51.70 48.00 11.70 59.70 6.83 4.88
TARGET 123 22 .00 51.99 48.00 11.99 59.99 6.99 4.99
TARGET # 24 23 ,00 52.27 48.00 12.27 60.27 7.16 5,11
TARGET 1 25 24 .00 59.42 51,60 9.82 67.42 5.73 4.09
TARGET 126 25 .00 59.70 57,60 10.10 67.70 5.89 4.21
TARGET 827 26 .00 59.99 57.60 10.39 67,99 6.06 4.33
TARGET 128 27 .00 60.27 57,60 10.67 68.27 6.23 4.45
TARGET 129 28 .00 67.42 67,20 8.22 75.42 4.79 3.42
TARGET 1 30 29 .00 67.70 67,20 8.50 75.70 4.96 3.54
TARGET # 31 30 .00 67.99 67,20 8.79 75.99 5.13 3.66
INPUT DATA
SAM SPEED, (NMIMIN) 25
TARGET SPEED 15
LAUNCHER CYCLE TIME .00 ATTACKING AIRCRAFT 30
ILLUMINATION (SXC.) 8
TARGET SPACINr (SEC.) I ASCM LAUNCH RANGE 30
SAM'S PER SALVO 1 ASCM SPEED 20
MAX SAM'S AIRBORNE 24
SEARCH RADAR HEIGHT 75 NUMBER 01 AsCM'$ 60
TARGET HEIGHT (FT.) 6
HORIZION RANGE (NM) 13.83 note: STATE OF THE ART AAW ESCORT, VERTICAL LAUNCH, PHASED ARRAY
DETECTION DELAY (SEC) 15
OPEN FIRE RANGE 10.09
LAUNCHER ILLUMINATOR LAUNCH TIME Of TIME OF RANGE e RANGE e
READY FREE TIME F.IG'' INTERCEPT LAUNCH INTERCEPT
TIME TARGET AT OPEN FIRE RANGE:
TARGET f 1 0 .00 .00 .00 15.11 15.11 10.00 b.30
TARGET 1 2 1 .00 .00 .00 15.49 15.49 10.33 6.45
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TARGET f3 2 .00 .00 .00 15,86 15.86 10.58 6.61
TARGET 1 4 3 .00 .00 .00 16.24 16,24 10.83 6.77
TARGET 9 5 4 .00 15.11 10.40 12,71 23.11 8.48 5.30
TARGET 9 6 5 .00 15.49 10.40 13,09 23.49 8,73 5,45
TARGET 9 7 6 .00 15.86 10.40 13,46 23.86 8.98 5.61
TARGET 98 7 .00 16.24 10.40 13.84 24.24 9.23 5.77
TARGET f 9 a .00 23.11 20.80 10.31 31.11 6.88 4.30
TARGET i 10 9 .00 23.49 20.80 10.69 31.49 7.13 4.45
TARGET 1 11 10 .00 23.86 20.80 11.06 31.86 7.38 4.61
TARGET 1 12 11 .00 24.24 20.80 11.44 32.24 7.63 4.77
TARGET 4 13 12 .00 31.11 31.20 7,91 39.11 5.28 3.30
TARGET f 14 13 .00 31.49 31,20 8.29 39,49 5.53 3.45
TARGET 9 15 14 .00 31,86 31.20 8.66 39.86 5.78 3.61
TARGET 9 16 15 .00 32.24 31.20 9.04 40.24 6,03 3.77
TARGET f 17 16 .00 39.11 41.60 5.51 47.11 3.68 2,30
TARGET 1 18 17 .00 39,49 41.60 5.89 47.49 3.93 2.45
TARGET 1 19 18 .00 39.tj6 41.60 6.26 47.86 4.18 2.61
TARGET f 20 19 .00 40.24 41.60 6.64 48.24 4.43 2.77
TARGET 9 21 20 .00 47.11 52.00 3.11 55.11 2.08 1.30
TARGET #22 21 .00 47.49 52.00 3,49 55.49 2.33 1.45
TARGET f 23 22 .00 47.86 52.00 3.86 55,86 2.58 1,61
TARGET 1 24 23 .00 48.24 52,00 4,24 56.24 2.83 1,77
TARGET 9 25 24 .00 55.11 62.40 .71 63.11 .48 .30
TARGET 9 26 25 .00 55.49 62,40 1,09 63,49 .73 .45
TARGET 1 27 26 .00 55.06 62.40 1.46 63.86 .98 .61
TARGET 1 28 27 .00 56.24 62.40 1.84 64.24 1.23 .77
TARGET 9 29 28 .00 63.11 72.80 -1,69 71,11 -1.12 -. 70
TARGET 0 30 29 .00 53.49 72.80 -1.31 71.49 -. 87 -. 55
TARGET 1 31 30 .00 63.86 72.80 -. 94 71.86 -. F -. 39
INPUT DATA
SAN SPEED, (NM/MIN) 25
TARGET SPEED 20
LAUNCHER CYCLE TIME .00 ATTACKING AIRCRAFT 30
ILLUMINATION (SEC.) 8
TARGET SPACING (SEC.) I ASCM LAUNCH RANGE 30
SAW'S PER SALVO I ASCM SPEED 20
MAX SAM'S AIRBORNE 24
SEARCH RADAR HEIGHT 75 NUMBER OF ASCM's 60
TARGET HEIGHT (FT.) 25
HORIZION RANGE (NM) 17.00 note: STATE OF THE ART AAW ESCORT, VERTICAL LAUNCH, PHASED ARRAY
DETECTION DELAY (SEC) 20
OPEN FIRE RANGE 10.33
LAUNCHER ILLUMINATOR LAUNCH TIME OF TIME OF RANGE 0 RANGE @
READY FREE TIME FLIGHT INTERCEPT LAUNCH INTERCEPT
TIME TARGET AT OPEN FIRE RANGE:
TARGET I 1 0 .00 .00 .00 13.78 13.78 10.33 5.74
TARGET 9 2 1 .00 .00 .00 14.22 14,22 10.67 5,93
TARGET 1 3 2 .00 .00 .00 14.67 14,67 11.00 6.11
TARGET 9 4 3 ,00 .00 .00 15.11 15,11 11.33 6.30
TARGET # 5 4 .00 13,78 11.20 10.58 21,78 7.93 4,41
TARGET 9 6 5 .00 14.22 11.20 11.02 22,22 8.27 4,59
TARGET 9 7 6 .00 14.67 11.20 11.47 22.67 8.60 4.78
TARGET 1 8 7 .00 15.11 11.20 11.91 23.11 8.93 4.96
TARGET 1 9 8 .00 21,78 22.40 7.38 29,78 5.53 3.07
TARGET 10 9 .00 22.22 22.40 7.82 30,22 5.87 3.26
TARGET 1 11 10 .00 22.67 22.40 8.27 30,67 6.20 3.44
TARGET 1 12 11 .00 23,11 22.40 8.71 31,11 6.53 3.63
TARGET 1 13 12 .00 29,78 33.60 4,18 37,78 3.13 1.74
TARGET 1 14 13 .00 30,22 33.60 4,62 38,22 3.47 1,93
TARGET 1 15 14 .00 30.67 33.60 5.07 38,67 3.80 2.11
TARGET 0 16 15 .00 31.11 33.60 5.51 39.11 4.13 2.30
TARGET 1 17 16 .00 37.78 44.80 .98 45.78 .73 .41
TARGET # 18 17 .00 38.22 44.80 1.42 46.22 1.07 .59
TARGET 9 19 18 .00 38.67 44.80 1.87 46.67 1,40 .78
TARGET 9 20 19 .00 39.11 44.80 2.31 47.11 1.73 .96
TARGET # 21 20 .00 45.78 56,00 -2.22 53,78 -1.67 -. 93
TARGET # 22 21 .00 46.22 56.00 -1.78 54.22 -1.33 -. 74
TARGET 1 23 22 .00 46.67 56.00 -1.31 54,67 -1.00 -. 56
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TARGET 1 24 23 .00 47.11 56.00 -. 89 55.11 -. 67 -. 37
TARET # 25 24 .00 53.78 67,20 -5.42 61.78 -4.07 -2.26
TARGET *26 25 .00 54.22 67.20 -4.98 62.22 -3.73 -k.07
TARGET 1 27 26 .00 54.67 67.20 -4.53 62.67 -3.40 -1.89
TARGET 128 27 .00 55.11 67.20 -4.09 63.11 -3.07 -1.70
TARGET 129 28 .00 61.78 78.40 -8.62 69.78 -6.47 -3.59
TARGET # 30 29 .00 62.22 78.40 -8.18 70.22 -6.13 -3.41
TARGET #31 30 .00 62.67 78.40 -7.73 70.67 -5.80 -3.22
121
INPUT DATA
SAM SPEED, (NM/MIN) 30
TARGET SPEED 10
LAUNCHER CYCLE TIME 30 ATTACKING AIRCRAFT 30
ILLUMINATION (SEC.) 30
TARGET SPACING (SEC.) 2 ASCM LAUNCH RANGE 30
SAM'S PER SALVO 2 ASCM SPEED 20
MAX SAM'S AIRBORNE 12
SBARCH RADAR HEIGHT 10000 NUMBER OF ASCM's 60
TARGET HEIGHT (FT.) 25
HORIZION RANGE (NM) 130.67 note! AIRSHIP (2 ILLUM.), LINKED WITH 1 NTU ESCORT (CG-16)
DETECTION DELAY (SEC) 80
OPEN FIRE RANGE 117.34
LAUNCHER ILLUMINATOR LAUNCH TIME OF TIME OF RANGE 0 RANGE @
READY FREE TIME FLIGHT INTERCEPT LAUNCH INTERCEPT
TIME TARGET AT OPEN FIRE RANGE:
TARGET 91 0 .00 .00 .00 176,01 176.01 117.34 88.00
TARGET 92 2 2.00 .00 2.00 176.01 179.01 117.34 89,00
TARGET 93 4 30.00 176.01 39.67 167,34 206.01 111,56 83,67
TARGET 14 6 32.00 178,01 40.67 167,34 208.01 111.56 63,67
TARGET 15 8 68.67 206.01 77.33 158,68 236.01 105.78 79,34
TARGET 9 6 10 70.67 208.01 79.33 156,68 238.01 105.78 79,34
TARGET 17 12 107,33 236.01 176.01 135,01 311.02 90.00 67,50
TARGET 98 14 109,33 238.01 178.01 135,01 313.02 90.00 67,50
TARGET 99 16 206.01 311.02 214.66 126,34 341.02 84.23 63,17
TARGET 910 19 208.01 313,02 216.68 126,34 343.02 84.23 63.17
TARGET 1 11 20 244.68 341.02 253.34 117.67 371.02 78.45 58,84
TARGET 1 12 22 246.68 343.02 255.34 117.67 373,02 78,45 58,84
TARGET 9 13 24 283,34 371.02 311.02 104,26 415.27 69.50 52,13
TARGET 9 14 26 285.34 373.02 313.02 104.26 417.27 69.50 52,13
TARGET 9 15 28 341.02 415.27 349.68 95.59 445.27 63,73 47,79
TARGET 9 16 30 343.02 417.27 351.68 95.59 447.27 63.73 47,79
TARGET 9 17 32 379.68 445.27 389,35 86.92 475.27 57,95 43,46
TARGET 918 34 381.68 447.27 390.35 86.92 477,27 57,95 43,46
TARGET 919 36 418,35 475.27 427.02 78.26 505.27 52,17 39,13
TARGET 920 38 420.35 477.27 429.02 78.26 507.27 52.17 39.13
TARGET 921 40 457.02 505.27 465.68 69.59 535.27 46.39 34,79
TARGET 922 42 459.02 507.27 467.6B 69,59 537.27 46,39 34,79
TARGET 923 44 495,68 535.27 504.35 60.92 565.27 40,61 30,46
TARGET 9 24 46 497.68 537.27 506.35 60,92 567.27 40.61 30.46
TARGET 9 25 48 534.35 565.27 543.02 52.26 595,27 34.84 26,13
TARGET 9 26 50 536.35 567.27 545.02 52.26 597.27 34,84 26,13
TARGET 9 27 52 573,02 595.27 581.68 43,59 625,27 29.06 21,79
TARGET 928 54 575.02 597.27 583,68 43.59 627.27 29.06 21,79
TARGET 9 29 56 611,68 625.27 620.35 34.92 655.27 23.28 17.46
TARGET 930 58 613.68 627.27 622.35 34.92 657.27 23.28 17,46




SAM SPEED, (NM/MIN) 30
TARGET SPEED 10
LAUNCHER CYCLE TIME 15.00 ATTACKING AIRCRAFT 30
ILLUMINATION (SEC.) 30
TARGET SPACING (SEC.) 1 ASCH LAUNCH RANGE 130
SAMPS PER SALVO 2 ASCM SPEED 10
MAX SAM'S AIRBORNE 24
SEARCH RADAR HEIGHT 10000 NUMBER OF ASCM'v 60
TARGET HFIGHT (FT.) 25
HORIZION RANGE (NM) 130,67 note: 4 ILLUMINATOR AIRSHIP, 2 NTU RAW ESCORTS
DETECTION DELAY (SEC) 80
OPEN FIRE RANGE 117.34
LAUNCHER ILLUMINATOR LAUNCH TIME OF TIME OF RANGE e RANGE @
READY FREE TIME FLIGHT INTERCEPT LAUNCH INTERCEPT
TIME TARGET AT OPEN FIRE RANGEt
TARGET f1 0 .00 .0O .00 176.01 176,01 117.34 88.00
TARGET 92 1 2.00 .00 2.00 175.76 177,76 117.17 87.88
TARGET #3 2 15.00 .00 15.00 172.76 197,76 115.17 86.38
TARGET 94 3 17.00 .00 17.00 172.51 189,51 115.01 86.25
TARGET f5 4 30.00 176.01 38.67 167.34 206,01 111.56 83.67
TARGET 9 6 5 32.00 177.76 40.67 167.09 207.76 111.40 83.55
TARGET f7 6 53.67 187.76 53.67 164.09 217,76 109.40 82.05
TARGET 98 7 55.67 199.51 55.67 163.84 219,51 109.23 81.92
TARGET 9 9 8 68.67 206,01 77.33 158.68 236,01 105,78 79,34
TARGET 910 9 70.67 207.76 79.33 158.43 237.76 105.62 79.21
TARGET 911 10 92.33 217.76 92,33 55.43 247.76 103.62 77,71
TARGET f 12 11 94.33 219.51 94.33 155,18 249,51 103.45 77.59
TARGET 913 12 107.33 236.01 176.01 135.01 311.02 90.00 67.50
TARGET f14 13 109.33 237.76 177.76 134.82 312.58 89.88 67,41
TARGET 915 14 191.01 247.76 191.01 131.76 322,77 87.84 65.88
TARGET 9 16 15 192.76 249.51 192.76 131.57 324.33 87.71 65.78
TARGET 0 17 16 206.01 311.02 214.68 126.34 341.02 84.23 63.17
TARGET 9 18 17 207.76 312.58 216.43 126.15 342.58 84.10 63.08
TARGET 919 18 229.68 322.77 229.68 123,09 352.77 82.06 61.55
TARGET 920 19 231.43 324.33 231.43 122.90 354.33 81,94 61.45
TARGET 9 21 20 244.68 341.02 253.34 117.67 371.02 78.45 58,84
TARGET 922 21 246.43 342,58 255,09 117.49 372.58 78.32 58,74
TARGET 923 22 268.34 352.77 268,34 114.42 382.77 76.28 57,21
TARGET 924 23 270.09 354,33 270.09 214.24 384.33 76.16 57.12
TARGET 9 25 24 283.34 371.02 311.02 104.26 415.27 69.50 52,13
TARGET 1 26 25 285.09 372.58 312.58 104.11 416.69 69.41 52,06
TARGET 9 27 26 326,02 382,77 326.02 101,01 427,02 67.34 50.50
TARGET 1 28 27 327.58 384.33 327.50 100,86 428.44 67,24 50.43
TARGET 929 28 341.02 415.27 349,68 95.59 445.27 63.73 47.79
TARGET 930 29 342.58 416,69 351,25 95.45 446.69 63.63 47,72
TARGET 9 31 30 364.68 427.02 364,68 92.34 457,02 61,56 46.17
TARGET f 32 31 366.25 428.44 366.25 92.20 458.44 61,47 46,10
TARGET 933 32 379.68 445.27 388.35 86.92 475.27 57.95 43,46
TARGET 934 33 381.25 446.69 389.91 86,78 476.69 57.85 43.39
TARGET 935 34 403.35 457.02 403.35 03.67 487.02 55.78 41,84
TARGET 9 36 35 404.91 458.44 404.91 83.53 488,44 55.69 41,77
TARGET 937 36 418.35 475.27 427.02 78.26 505.27 52.17 39.13
TARGET 938 37 419.91 476.69 428.50 78.11 506,69 52.08 39.CS
TARGET 1 39 38 442.02 487.02 442.02 75.01 517,02 50,00 37.50
TARGET 940 39 443.58 488.44 443.58 74.86 518,44 49,91 37,43
TARGET 941 40 457.02 505.27 465.68 69.59 535.27 46,39 34,79
TARGET 142 41 458.58 506.69 467.25 69.45 536.69 46.30 34.72TARGET 9 43 42 480.68 517.02 480.68 66.34 547.02 44.23 33,17
TARGET f 44 43 482.25 518.44 482.25 66.20 548,44 44.13 33.10TARGET 1 45 44 495.68 535.27 504.35 60.92 565.27 40.61 30.46
TARGET 946 45 497.25 536.69 505,91 60.78 566,69 40.52 30.39
TARGET 9 47 46 519.35 547.02 519.35 57.67 577.02 38,45 28.84
TARGET 9 48 47 520.91 548.44 520.91 57.53 578.44 38,35 28.77
TARGET 9 49 48 534.35 565.27 543.02 52,26 595.27 34.84 26.13
TARGET 9 50 49 535.91 566.69 544,58 52.11 596.69 34.74 26,06
TARGET 1 51 50 558.02 577.02 558.02 49.01 607.02 32.67 24,50
TARGET 9 52 51 559.58 578.44 b59.58 48.86 608.44 32.58 24.43
TARGET 1 53 52 573.02 595.27 581.68 43.59 625.27 29.06 21.79
TARGET 9 54 53 574.58 596.69 583.25 43.45 626.69 28.97 21,72
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TARGET 1 55 54 596.68 607.02 596.68 40,34 637.02 26.89 20.17
TARGET # 56 55 598.25 608.44 598.25 40.20 638.44 26.80 20,10
TARGET f 57 56 611.68 625.27 620.35 34.92 655.27 23.28 17.46
TARGET 6 58 57 613.25 626.69 621.91 34.78 656.69 23.19 17.39
TARGET # 59 58 635.35 637.02 635.35 31.67 667.02 21.11 15.84
TARGET f 60 59 636.91 638.44 636.91 31.53 668,44 21.02 15.77
TARGET f 61 60 650.35 655.27 659.02 26.26 685,27 17.50 13,13
INPUT DATA
SAM SPEED, (NM/MIN) 30
TARGET SPEED 10
LAUNCHER CYCLE TIME 15.00 ATTACKING AIRCRAFT 30
ILLUMINATION (SEC.) 30
TARGET SPACING (SEC.) 2 ASCM LAUNCH RANGE 30
SAM'S PER SALVO 2 ASCM SPEED 10
MAX SAM'S AIRBORNE 24
SEARCH RADAR HEIGHT 10000 NUMBER OF ASCU'S 60
TARGET HEIGHT (FT.) 25
HORIZION RANGE (NM) 130.67 note: 4 ILLUMINATOR AIRSHIP, 2 NTU AAW ESCORTS
DETECTION DELAY (SEC) 80
OPEN FIRE RANGE 117.34
LAUNCHER ILLUMINATOR LAUNCH TIME OF TIME OF RANGE 0 RANGE e
READY FREE TIME FLIGHT INTERCEPT LAUNCH INTERCEPT
TIME TARGET AT OPEN FIRE RANGE:
TARGET f 1 0 .00 .00 .00 176.01 176,01 117.34 88.00
TARGET # 2 2 2,00 .00 2.00 176,01 178,01 117.34 88,00
TARGET 63 4 15.00 .00 15.00 173.26 188.26 115.51 86,63
TARGET 6 4 6 17.00 .00 17.00 173,26 190,26 115.51 86,63
TARGET 65 B 30.00 176.01 37.33 168,68 206,01 112.45 84,34
TARGET 66 10 32.00 178.01 39.33 168,68 208.01 112.45 84,34
TARGET 6 7 12 52.33 188.26 52.33 165,93 218.26 110.62 82.96
TARGET 6 8 14 54.33 190.26 54.33 165.93 220.26 110.62 82.96
TARGET 6 9 16 67.33 206.01 74.67 161,34 236.01 107.56 80.67
TARGET 610 18 69.33 208.01 76.67 161.34 238,01 107.56 80.67
TARGET 1 11 20 89.67 218.26 69.67 158,59 248.26 105.73 79.30
TARGET 1 12 22 91.67 220.26 91.67 158.59 250.26 105.73 79,30
TARGET 6 13 24 104.67 236.01 176.01 138,01 314.02 92.00 69,00
TARGET 1 14 26 106.67 238.01 178.01 138.01 316.02 92,00 69.00
TARGET 1 15 28 191.01 248.26 191.01 135,26 326,27 90.17 67.63
TARGET 1 16 30 193.01 250.26 193.01 135,26 328.27 90.17 67.63
TARGET 1 17 32 206.01 314.02 213.34 130,67 344.02 87.12 65.34
TARGET 1 18 34 208.01 316.02 215.34 130.67 346.02 87.12 65,34
TARGET 1 19 36 228.34 326.27 228.34 127.92 356.27 85.28 63.96
TARGET 1 20 38 230.34 328.27 230.34 127.92 358.27 85.28 63.96
TARGET 6 21 40 243.34 344.02 250.68 123.34 374.02 82.23 61.67
TARGET 1 22 42 245.34 346.02 252.68 123.34 376.02 82.23 61.67
TARGET 6 23 44 265.68 356.27 265.68 120.59 386.27 80.39 60.30
TARGET 1 24 46 267.68 358.27 267.68 120.59 388.27 80.39 60.30
TARGET 1 25 48 280.68 374.02 314.02 109.51 423.52 73.00 54.75
TARGET 1 26 50 282.68 376.02 316.02 109.51 425.52 73.00 54.75
TARGET 1 27 52 329.02 386.27 329.02 106.76 435.77 71.17 53.38
TARGET 1 28 54 331.02 388.27 331.02 106.76 437.77 71.17 53.38
TARGET # 29 56 344.02 423.52 351.35 102,17 453.52 68.11 51.09
TARGET f 30 58 346.02 425.52 353.35 102.17 455.52 68.11 51.09
TARGET 6 31 0 366.35 435.77 386.35 79.42 465.77 52.95 39.71
TARGET 6 32 2 368.35 437.77 388.35 79.42 467.77 52.95 39.71
TARGET 633 4 401.35 453.52 408.68 74.84 483.52 49,89 37.42
TARGET 634 6 403.35 455.52 410.68 74.84 485.52 49.89 37.42
TARGET 1 35 8 423.68 465.77 423.68 72.09 495.77 48.06 36.04
TARGET I 36 10 425.68 467.77 425.68 72.09 497.77 48.06 36.04
TARGET # 37 12 438.68 483.52 446.02 67.51 513.52 45.00 33,75
TARGET # 38 14 440.68 485.52 448.02 67.51 515.52 45.00 33.75
TARGET # 39 16 461.02 495.77 461.02 64,76 525.77 43.17 32,38
TARGET 6 40 18 463.02 497.77 463.02 64,76 527.77 43.17 32.38
TARGET f 41 20 476.02 513.52 483.35 60.17 543.52 40.11 30.09
TARGET 6 42 22 478.02 515.52 485.35 60.17 545.52 40.11 30.09
TARGET 6 43 24 498.35 525.77 498.35 57.42 555.77 38.28 28.71
TARGET 6 44 26 500.35 527.77 500.35 57.42 557.77 38.28 28,71
TARGET 6 45 28 513.35 543.52 520.68 52.84 573.52 35.23 26.42
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TARGET 0 46 30 515.35 545.52 522.68 52.84 575.52 35.23 26.42
TARGET 1 47 32 535.68 555.77 535.68 50.09 585.77 33.39 25.04
TARGET 1 48 34 537.68 557.77 537.68 50.09 587.77 33.39 25,04
TARGET 1 49 36 550.68 573.52 558.02 45.51 603.52 30.34 22.75
TARGET f 50 38 552.68 575.52 560.02 45.51 605.52 30.34 22.75
TARGET 951 40 573.02 585.77 573.02 42.76 615.77 28.50 21.38
TARGET 1 52 42 575.02 587.77 575.02 42.76 617.77 28.50 21.38
TARGET 953 44 588.02 603.52 595.35 38.17 633.52 25.45 19.09
TARGET 9 54 46 590.02 605.52 597.35 38,17 635.52 25.45 19,09
TARGET 9 55 48 610.35 615.77 610,35 35.42 645.77 23.61 17,71
TARGET 9 56 50 612.35 617.77 612.35 35.42 647.77 23.61 17.71
TARGET 1 57 52 625.35 633.52 632.68 30.84 663.52 20.56 15.42
TARGET # 58 54 627.35 635.52 634.68 30.84 665.52 20.56 15.42
TARGET 1 59 56 647.68 645.77 647.68 28.09 675.77 18.73 14.04
TARGET 9 60 58 649.68 647.77 649.68 28.09 677.77 10.73 14.04
TARGET f 61 60 662.68 663.52 670.02 23.51 693.52 15.67 11.75
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INPUT DATA
SAM SPEED, (NM/MIN) 30
TARGET SPEED 10
LAUNCHER CYCLE TIME 15.00 ATTACKING AIRCRAFT 30
ILLUMINATION (SEC.) 30
TARGET SPACING (SEC.) 2 ASCM LAUNCH RANGE 30
SAM'S PER SALVO 2 ASCM SPEED 20
MAX SAM'S AIRBORNE 24
SEARCH RADAR HEIGHT 10000 NUMBER OF ASCWMa 60
TARGET HEIGHT (FT.) 25
HORIZION RANGE (NM) 130.67 note: AIRSHIP (6 ILLUM.)# LINKED WITH 2 NTU ESCORTS (CG-16)
DETECTION DEL\Y (SEC) 80
OPEN FIRE RANGE 117.34
LAUNCHER ILLUMINATOR LAUNCH TIME OF TIME OF RANGE RANGE e
READY FREE TIME FLIGHT INTERCEPT LAUNCH INTERCEPT
TIME TARGET AT OPEN FIRE RANGE:
TARGET 61 0 .00 .00 .00 176.01 176.01 117.34 88.00
TARGET 62 2 2.00 .00 2.00 176.01 178.01 117.34 88.00
TARGET 1 3 4 15.00 .00 15,00 173.26 188,26 115.51 86.63
TARGET f4 6 17.00 .00 17.00 173.26 190.26 115.51 86,63
TARGET 65 8 30.00 .00 30.00 170.51 200.51 113.67 85.25
TARGET 66 10 32,00 .00 32,00 170,51 202,51 113.67 85.25
TARGET 67 12 45.00 176,01 45,00 167.76 212,76 111,84 83.88
TARGET 68 14 47,0 178,01 47.00 167.76 214,76 111.84 83,88
TARGET 19 16 60.0n 188.26 60.00 165.01 225.01 110.01 82.50
TARGET 610 18 .00 190.26 62.00 165.01 227.01 110.01 82.50
TARGET 111 20 i6,00 200.51 75.00 162.26 237.26 108.17 81,13
TARGET 612 22 77.00 202,51 77.00 162.26 239.26 108.17 81,13
TARGET 613 24 90,00 212.76 90,00 159.51 249.51 106.34 79.75
TARGET 614 26 92.00 214.76 92,00 159.51 251.51 106.34 79,75
TARGET 615 28 105.00 225.01 105.00 156.76 261.76 104,51 78.38
TARGET f16 30 107,00 227,01 107,00 156,76 263,76 104,51 78,38
TARGET 617 32 120,00 237.26 120,00 154.01 274,01 102.67 77,00
TARGET 118 34 122,00 239,26 122,00 154,01 276.01 102.67 77.00
TARGET 619 36 135.00 249,51 135,00 151,26 286.26 100,84 75,63
TARGET 620 38 137,00 251.51 137,00 151.26 288.26 100,84 75,63
TARGET 621 40 150,00 261,76 150,00 148,51 298,51 99,01 74,25
TARGET 6 22 42 152,00 26.,76 152,00 148,51 300,51 99,01 74,25
TARCET 623 44 165,00 274.01 165,00 145.76 310.76 97.17 72,88
TARGET 624 46 167.00 276.01 167,00 145.76 312.76 97.17 72.88
TARGET 6 25 48 180,00 286,26 180,.00 143.01 323,01 95.34 71,50
TARGET 626 50 182,00 288.26 182.00 143.01 325.01 95,34 71,50
TARGET 627 52 195,00 298.51 195,00 140.26 335.26 93.51 70,13
TARGET 628 54 197.00 300.51 197.00 140,26 337.26 93.51 70,13
TARGET 6 29 56 210,00 310.76 210.00 137,51 347,51 91.67 68,75
TARGET 630 58 212.00 312.76 212,00 137.51 349.51 91.67 68,75
TARGET 631 2 225,00 323,01 235,33 117,68 353.01 78,45 58,84
TARGET f32 4 227.00 325.01 237.33 117.68 355.01 78.45 58,84
TARGET f33 6 250.33 335.26 250,33 114.93 365.26 76.62 57,46
TARGET 634 8 252.33 337.26 252.33 114,93 367.26 76,62 57,46
TARGET 635 10 265.33 347.51 265.33 112.18 377.51 74.78 56,09
TARGET 636 12 267,33 349.51 267.33 112,18 379.51 74.78 56,09
TARGET 637 14 280.33 353.01 280.33 109.43 389.76 72.95 54,71
TARGET 638 16 282.33 355.01 282.33 109.43 391.76 72.95 54,71
TARGET 639 18 295.33 365.26 295.33 106.68 402.01 71.12 53.34
TARGET f40 20 297.33 367.26 297,33 106.68 404,01 71.12 53.34
TARGET 41 22 310.33 377,51 310,33 103.93 414.26 69.28 51.96
TARGET 42 24 312.33 379,51 31.2.33 103.93 416.26 69.28 51.96
TARGET #43 26 325.33 389.76 325.33 101,18 426.51 67.45 50,59
TARGET 644 28 327.33 391,76 327,33 101.18 428.51 67.45 50.59
TARGET 645 30 340.33 402.01 340,33 98,43 438.76 65,62 49.21
TARGET 646 32 342.33 404.01 342.33 98.43 440.76 65.62 49.21
TARGET 647 34 355.33 414.26 355.33 95.68 451.01 63.78 47.84
TARGET 148 36 357.33 416.26 357.33 95.68 453.01 63.78 47.84
TARGET 649 38 370.33 426.51 370.33 92.93 463.26 61.95 46.46
TARGET 650 40 372.33 428.51 372.33 92.93 465.26 61.95 46.46
TARGET 6 51 42 385.33 438.76 385.33 90.18 475.51 60.12 45.09
TARGET 652 44 387.33 440.76 387.33 90.18 477.53 60.12 45.09
TARGET # 53 46 400.33 451.01 400.33 87,43 487.76 58.28 43.71
TARGET 654 48 402.33 453.01 402.33 87,43 489.76 58.28 43.71
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TARGET 1 55 50 415.33 463.26 415.33 84.68 500.01 56.45 42,34
TARGET 1 56 52 417.33 465.26 417.33 84,68 502.01 56.45 42.34
TARGET # 57 54 430.33 475.51 430.33 81.93 512.26 54.62 40,96
TARGET # 58 56 432.33 477.51 432.33 81.93 514.26 54.62 40.96
TARGET # 59 58 445.33 487.76 445.33 79,18 524.51 52.76 39.59
TARGET 1 60 60 447.33 489.76 447,33 79.18 526.51 52.78 39,59
INPUT DATA
SAM SPEED, (NM/MIN) 30
TARGET SPEED 10
LAUNCHER CYCLE TIME 7.50 ATTACKING AIRCRAFT 30
ILLUMINATION (SEC.) 30
TARGET SPACING (SEC.) 2 ASCM LAUNCH RANGE 30
SAM'S PER SALVO 1 ASCM SPEED 20
MAX SAM'S AIRBORNE 24
SEARCH RADAR HEIGHT 5000 NUMBER OF ASCM'S 60
TARGET HEIGHT (FT.) 25
HORIZION RANGE (NM) 94.22 note: AIRSHIP (6 ILLUI4.), LINKED WITH 2 NTU ESCORTS (CG-16}
DETECTION DELAY (SEC) 30
OPEN FIRE RANGE 89,22
LAUNCHER ILLUMINATOR LAUNCH TIME OF TIME OF RANGE RANGE 0
READY FREE TIME FLIGHT INTERCEPT LAUNCH INTERCEPT
TIME TARGET AT OPEN FIRE RANGE:
TARGET 1. 0 l00 .00 l00 133.83 133.83 89.22 66,92
TARGET 12 2 2.00 .00 2,00 133,83 135.83 89.22 66.92
TARGET #3 4 7.50 .00 7.50 132,96 140.46 88,64 66,48
TARGET 64 6 9,50 .00 9.50 132.96 142.46 88.64 66,48
TARGET 15 8 15,00 .00 15.00 132.08 147.08 88.06 66,04
TARGET 6 6 10 17.00 .00 17.00 132.08 149.06 88,06 66,04
TARGET # 7 12 22,50 13J.83 36.00 127,83 163.83 85.22 63,92
TARGET #6 14 24,50 135,83 38.00 127.83 165.83 85.22 63,92
TARGET #9 16 43,50 140.46 43.50 126.96 170.46 84.64 63,48
TARGET 1 10 18 45.50 142.46 45,50 126,96 172.46 84.64 63,48
TARGET #11 20 51.00 147.08 51.00 126,08 177.08 84.06 63,04
TARGET #12 22 53.00 149.08 53.00 126.08 179.08 84.06 63,04
TARGET 1 13 24 58.50 163.83 72.00 121.83 193.83 81,22 60,92
TARGET f14 26 60,50 165,83 74,00 121.83 195.83 81.22 60,92
TARGET 615 28 79,50 170.46 79.50 120.96 200.46 80.64 60,48
TARGET #16 30 81,50 172.46 81.50 120,96 202.46 60.64 60,48
TARGET # 17 32 87,00 177.08 87.00 120.08 207.08 80.06 60.04
TARGET 1 18 34 89.00 179.08 89.00 120.08 209.08 80,06 60.04
TARGET #19 36 94.50 193.83 108.00 115.83 223.83 77.22 57,92
TARGET #20 38 96.50 195,83 110.00 115.83 225.83 77.22 57,92
TARGET #21 40 115.50 200.46 115.50 114.96 230.46 76.64 57,48
TARGET #22 42 117.50 202.46 117.50 114.96 232.46 76.64 57,48
TARGET #23 44 123,00 207,00 123.00 114,08 237.08 76.06 57,04
TARGET #24 46 125.00 209.08 125.00 114.08 239.08 76.06 57,04
TARGET f 25 48 130,50 223.83 144,00 109.83 253,83 73.22 54.92
TARGET 626 50 132.50 225.83 146.00 109.83 255.83 73.22 54,92
TARGET #27 52 151.50 230.46 151,50 108.96 260.46 72.64 54,48
TARGET 428 54 153.50 232.46 153.50 108.96 262.46 72.64 54.48
TARGET # 29 56 159.00 237.08 159.00 108.08 267.08 72.06 54.04
TARGET 130 58 161.00 239.08 161.00 108.08 269.08 72.06 54.04
TARGET #31 2 166.50 253.83 199.33 84.50 283.83 56.33 42.25
TARGET #32 4 168.50 255.83 201.33 84.50 28b.83 56,33 42.25
TARGET 33 6 206.83 260.46 206.83 83,63 290.46 55.75 41,81
TARGET 134 8 208.83 262.46 208.83 83.63 292.46 55.75 41,81
TARGET f35 10 214.33 267.08 214.33 82.75 297.08 55,17 41,38
TARGET #36 12 216.33 269,08 216.33 82.75 299,08 55.17 41.38
TARGET # 37 14 221.83 283.83 235.33 78.50 313.83 52,33 39,25
TARGET #38 16 223.83 285,83 237.33 78.50 315.83 52.33 39,25
TARGET #39 18 242.83 290.46 242.83 77.63 320.46 51.75 38.81
TARGET 440 20 244.83 292.46 244.83 77.63 322.46 51.75 38,81
TARGET 641 22 250.33 297.08 250.33 76.75 327,08 51.17 30,38
TARGET #42 24 252.33 299.08 252.33 76.75 329.08 51,17 38,38
TARGET 143 26 257.83 313.83 271.33 72.50 343.03 48.33 36,25
TARGET # 44 28 259,83 315.83 273.33 72.50 345.83 48.33 36,25
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TARGET 145 30 278.83 320.46 278.83 11,63 353.46 47,75 35.81
TARGET 146 32 280,83 322.46 280.83 71.63 352.46 A7,'15 35.81
TARGET 1 47 34 286.33 327.08 286.33 70,75 357.08 47,17 35.38
TARGET 1 48 36 288.33 329.08 288.33 70.75 359.08 47.17 35.38
TARGET 1 49 38 293.83 343.83 307.33 66.50 373.83 44.33 33.25
TARGET 1 50 40 295.83 345.83 309.33 66.50 375.83 44.33 33.25
TARGET 1 51 42 314,83 350.46 314.83 65.63 300,46 43,75 32.81
TARGET 1 52 44 316,83 352.46 316.83 65.63 382,46 43,75 32.81
TARGET 1 53 46 322.33 357.08 322.33 64,75 387.08 43.17 32.38
TARGET 1 54 48 324.33 359.08 324.33 64.75 389.08 43.17 32.38
TARGET 1 55 50 329,83 373.83 343.33 60,50 403,83 40,33 30.25
TARGET 1 56 52 331.83 375.83 345.33 60,50 405.83 40.33 30.25
TARGET 1 57 54 350.83 380.46 350.33 59.63 410.46 39.75 29.81
TARGET f 58 56 352.83 382.46 352.83 59.63 412.46 39,75 29.81
TARGET 1 59 58 358.33 387.08 358.33 58,75 417.08 39,17 29.38
TARGET 1 60 60 360.33 389.08 360.33 58.75 419.08 39,17 29,38
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APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTAL CALCULATIONS, TABLES AND FIGURES
A. Depth Of Fire Calculations
To generate the DOF contours in this paper, the basic firepower equations where taken
from NOA [Ref. 22 :pp. 230-233] and modified to account for low flying targets and fire
control system limitations. The following assumptions hold:
a. both the ASCM velocity (V, in nm/sec) and height above water (HM, in feet) are known.
b. the search radar height (HI, in feet), SAM velocity (U), Fire Control System Delays (FD)
and the Damage Assesment Delay (TD ,in seconds), are known.
Then, as in Figure 6:
R1l (nm), the radar horizon is found as: (214R + 2HM)J (5280/6000)
* FR (nm), the range of the ASCM at the launching of the first SAM is found as:
N l- (FD x V)
and the maximum effective range of the SAM, (Rx ), Is taken as FR
RD= TO x V, the distances traveled by the ASCM during a damage assesment delay
For an arbitray RA:
a. The total path length of the ASCM through the. engagement zone is:
PL = cos .1 ( RcA/ Rx)
Given a closing Target,
The Target Angle is:
TA(M) - sin`'(RcA /RX)
The Lead Angle is:
LA(1) - sin" [(U sin (TA) )/V]
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The included angle between TA and LA is;
PHI = 180 - (TA + LA)
Then, by the law of sines:
_ý(1) - Rx sir. (TA) / sin (PHI)
RT(1) = Rx sin (LA)/sin (PHI)
At the completion of the first intercept, if there is no time delay before the next
SAM is launched and the target is still closing, then the new target and lead angles
would be:
TA(2) = sin.1 ( R / RI(I))
LA(2) = ( U sin (TA) ) / V
Where R.(l) is substituted for Rx.
However, if there is a Damage assesment Delay, the value for RI(1) will no longer
reflect the proper distance to the target at the instant of SAM launch and must be
updated. A value, R,, is substituted for R1 . RI, is found using the following
relationships. The the ASCMs distance from CPA at the end of the Damage
Assesment delay is:
DCPA = PL/2-- [R(1)+RI + .
Thus the actual distance from the launching ship to the target at the end of the damage
assesment delay, R1', is found as:
R l' = [ (D CPA) ' + (R CA ) ý I "'
Then the true target angle may be found as:
TA(2) = sin-' (RCPA I R1.)
Given an opening target:
TA(2) = 180 - sin-' ( RA / R.)
LA(2) = sin'( (U cos (TA-90) )/V)
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PHI = 180 - (TA + LA)
Where DCPA for opening targets is: [Rr(1) + RLJ
TABLE 18
PREDICTED VERSES ACTUAL AIRSHIP FIRST UNIT COSTS BY C.E.R.
AIRSHIP ACTUAL PREDICTED % ERROR
AKRON 46.0 37.8 -21.8
MACON 31.0 37.8 17.9
GOODYEAR' 123.0 85.3 -44.1
ZPG-3W 2S.0 27.2 8.2
XZSG-4 8.2 8.6 4.2
ZPG-1 18.6 18.1 -2.7
R-100 17.7 27.7 36.3
R-101 19.7 19.8 0.6
ZR-I 16.6 9.5 -73.9
LZ-127 10.9 18.0 39.4
LZ-129 31.3 28.5 -9.5
R-36 11.5 12.1 5.0
R-80 8.9 8.0 -10.7
Source, J.W. Noah [Ref. 28:p. 5] as supplied to OP-96V.
'Proposed Goodyear design never constructed, data point from Goodyear's projected












Figure 27. ODM Brief, August 1987, source NADC, page 1 of 4
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